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Demanding the Best:
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[The Section 8 household-based subsidy program] is a big and very effective
program. It has virtually no downside except that it costs money to authorize more
vouchers.... We don't have any problem getting landlords to accept Section 8
vouchers anywhere because they are guaranteed to be paid by the federal
government.
- Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary of the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)'
Why don't you try to find a decent apartment in this city using Section 8?
- Andrell Crowder-Jordan, President of the Techwood-Clark Howell
Public Housing Resident Association, addressing Renee Lewis Glover,
Executive Director of the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta2
Henry Cisneros and others believe that the Section 8 household-based rental
assistance program can alleviate the housing problems of poor families. Under
this program, the federal government allocates funds to local Public Housing
Agencies (PHAs) 3 which in turn subsidize qualifying families through partial
rent payments to their landlords. Families can choose their own apartments in
the local housing market, provided that both the apartment quality and lease
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 1997; M.P.A. candidate, Princeton University's Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1997; B.A., Yale University, 1991. The author
would like to thank Professors Robert Ellickson, Michael Graetz, Jerry Mashaw, and Robert Solomon
for their advice; Douglas Rae, Dan Ryan, and Monica Pacello Blazik for their technical assistance; and
the staffs and clients of the New York Legal Aid Society and the Atlanta Legal Aid Society for
providing the inspiration for this project.
1. Henry G. Cisneros, Break Up Pockets of Poor in Cities, USA TODAY, June 15, 1993, at 13A.
2. Meeting of the Planning Committee for the Techwood-Clark Howell Public Housing
Development, in Atlanta, Georgia (July 14, 1995) (attended by author) (discussing difficulties
that face public housing residents who try to use Section 8 certificates in private market as
they attempt to relocate from public housing complex facing demolition and mixed-income
redevelopment).
3. Although PHAs generally operate locally, some have statewide jurisdiction. See 42
U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6) (1995). Unless otherwise specified, the term PHA refers here to local agencies.
See Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregation and Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 209, 216 n.29
(1994). Recently revised certificate and voucher regulations use the term Housing Agencies (HAs). 24
C.F.R. § 982.1(a) (1996).
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meet federal standards. Many conservatives assert that this demand-side
program is more efficient than supply-side housing policies4 such as public
housing and project-based housing assistance, and liberals generally believe that
the program helps reduce the geographic isolation of the urban poor,
particularly minorities. With broad bipartisan support, the program has
expanded dramatically since its inception in 1974 and now serves close to a
million and a half households nationally.
Many low-income families, however, know that the Section 8 program5 is
seriously flawed in many ways. For example, recipients often cannot locate
desirable apartments because many local landlords simply refuse to rent to
Section 8 families. After searching for three months for an apartment that she
could rent with her subsidy, Saria Johnson explained: "The problem with
looking in the paper is you find something, in a nice area. You know exactly
where this house is. You know what it looks like. The rent is perfect, it's got
everything you need, but they don't accept Section 8. "6 Unfortunately, low
landlord participation is only one of the many serious problems with the
existing Section 8 program.
How should the federal government improve Section 8 policy in order to
help the Johnsons and other poor families obtain decent housing? This Note
provides a comprehensive analysis of the program within a principled
framework for evaluating national low-income rental housing policy. It
proposes important and controversial reforms to the program, and it demon-
strates that current congressional reform proposals are seriously misguided.
Part I establishes an analytical guide to evaluate national low-income rental
housing policy in light of the critical housing problems of urban America:
staggering rent burdens for poor households and intense geographic concentra-
tion of impoverished minorities. Part II explains that a well-desigued demand-
side policy could effectively address these problems. In comparison to public
housing and other supply-side programs, for example, an appropriate demand-
side policy would be less expensive and more conducive to residential choice.
Part I then describes the nation's primary demand-side housing program,
household-based Section 8, as structured in February 1996.
Unfortunately, the current Section 8 program does not fulfill the potential
of demand-side rental housing policy. Part IV explains that the Section 8
eligibility requirements do not appropriately target the most needy families.
Also, by requiring families to find quality apartments quickly, the Section 8
4. Supply-side programs target funds to specific units in the public and private housing markets,
in contrast to demand-side programs that provide money to recipients to find housing on their own.
5. For convenience, this Note uses the term "Section 8 program" to refer only to the demand-side,
or household-based, Section 8 program. See infra note 35 (listing supply-side Section 8 programs).
6. HUD Voucher System Debate Steams Forward as Cuts Loom (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 26,
1995) (transcript on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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policy has disadvantaged many minorities and large families who are unable to
locate apartments and thus lose their housing subsidies. Reforms should be
enacted to target assistance more narrowly and to help all qualifying families
actually find apartments.
Part V demonstrates that the Section 8 program has not succeeded in its
goal of promoting residential choice. Many Section 8 enrollees encounter
landlords who are unwilling to participate in the program, because of
regulatory burdens imposed by the program, or because they intentionally
discriminate against minorities or families with children. At the same time, the
program does not adequately encourage PHAs to promote landlord participation
or interjurisdictional mobility. As a result, Section 8 enrollees in many cities
have difficulty finding landlords willing to rent to them. Often, subsidy
recipients can only find housing within a "Section 8 submarket," typically
located in neighborhoods with high rates of poverty and high concentrations of
minorities. To address these problems, the federal government should
restructure the manner in which PHAs provide assistance and it should reduce
undue regulatory burdens currently placed on landlords. It also should establish
strict anti-discrimination provisions that prevent landlords from refusing to rent
to individuals on the basis of their status as Section 8 recipients or because of
the requirements of the Section 8 program.
Part VI argues that the Section 8 program fails to harness the power of
choice in order to ensure that residents live in quality affordable housing. The
program consists of two variants, the certificate and voucher programs, each
of which employs different payment structures to determine government
payments at various rent levels. Neither the certificate nor the voucher
program, however, provides sufficient incentives for households to improve
housing quality or economize on rent. This Note therefore proposes a new
payment structure that does incorporate proper economic incentives.
Part VII explains that a well-designed Section 8 program would be a
valuable social welfare program, significantly better than the alternative of
simple cash transfers to the poor. It concludes by demonstrating that current
Republican proposals are unsound because they would redirect assistance to
higher income families, fail to promote residential choice, and establish
inappropriate payment structures. Finally, the Appendix explores various
arguments of this Note by analyzing demographic, housing market, and Section
8 patterns in and around New Haven, Connecticut.
Many of the flaws of the Section 8 program result from the inappropriate
use of certain supply-side housing policies in a demand-side program. For
example, thousands of local PHAs, originally established to build and operate
public housing, now administer most household-based Section 8 subsidies. This
highly localized administrative structure generally limits the ability of poor
urban residents to move to higher-income suburban areas.
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A second vestige of supply-side housing policy is the Section 8 program's
extensive regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship through federal eviction
standards and housing quality requirements. The eviction standards make the
Section 8 program significantly less appealing to many private landlords, thus
limiting the residential choice of subsidy recipients that want to move to better
neighborhoods. Moreover, the federal housing quality standards have caused
a significant number of poor households to lose their housing subsidies
completely because they have been unable to locate adequate apartments within
the two month period generally allotted to them.
The payment structure of the Section 8 certificate program is another
inappropriate carryover from public housing policy. Like public housing
residents, certificate recipients pay a fixed portion (now thirty percent) of their
adjusted income for their housing. Unfortunately, this payment structure
completely fails to motivate certificate recipients to search for better housing
deals. Because of these and other defects with the program, household-based
Section 8 is an ineffective policy for promoting housing affordability and
residential choice among poor households.
I. EVALUATING FEDERAL LOW-INCOME RENTAL HOUSING POLICY
This Note evaluates the household-based Section 8 program against a
benchmark of objectives for federal low-income rental housing policy.
Establishing these objectives requires a preliminary examination of the two
fundamental residential problems facing the urban poor: the lack of affordable
housing and the limitations on residential choice.
A. Housing Pmblems of the Urban Poor
Many of the nation's poorest urban families spend the majority of their
income on housing. In 1993, for example, more than 4.4 million households
with incomes less than 50% of area median income lived in adequate and
uncrowded housing but spent over half of their incomes on rent and utilities.7
The housing affordability crisis has resulted from a combination of lower
incomes and higher rents. Between 1975 and 1991, renters' real household
incomes fell by roughly 5% at the twenty-fifth percentile of the income
7. Housing and UrbanDevelopmentOversight: Hearingsbeforethe Subcomm.for Veterans'Affairs,
Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
LEXIS FDCH Cong. Testimony, Jan. 26, 1995 (statement of Michael A. Stegman, Assist. Sec. for Pol.
Devel. and Research, HUD) (citing the 1993 American Housing Survey (AHS)). Some observers
contend that this affordability data is unreliable because poor households tend to understate their actual
income. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Casefor an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 28, 28-30 (1992). But see CONG. BUDGEr OFFICE, THE CHALLENGES
FACING FEDERAL RENTAL ASsISrANCE PROGRAMS 16-18 (1994) (explaining that AHS indicators may
understate the actual share of income that poorest households pay for housing) [hereinafter CONG.
BUDGET OFFRCE].
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distribution! During the same period, real gross rents increased by over 20%
at the twenty-fifth percentile of the rent distribution.9 Although some poor
households do live in substandard housing, the more serious problem is
affordability, not housing quality.10
Another troubling aspect of the nation's housing situation is the severe
isolation of the poor, particularly the minority poor, in central cities. Between
1970 and 1990, for example, the number of poor people living in urban Census
tracts with at least 20% poverty levels increased from 4.2 million to 6.5
million." The overwhelming majority of those living in extreme poverty areas
are black or Hispanic. 2
The isolation of the inner-city minority poor has several causes. First, many
middle-class families have left central cities because of such factors as urban
crime, suburban job growth, and government homeownership subsidies. 3
Second, poor minority households have concentrated in certain urban areas
because of discrimination in public 4 and private5 housing, suburban zoning
laws' 6 and transportation constraints, 7 in addition to other factors."
8. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, xiii.
9. Id. at 18 (stating that improvements in quality account for only about thirty-five percent of total
rent increases). One cause of the rental increases is the loss of inexpensive rental units in the central
cities. See William C. Apgar, Jr., An Abundance of Housing forAll but the Poor, in HOUSING MARKETS
AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 53, 120-21 (G. Thomas Kingsley & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1993)
(describing large losses of urban low-cost rental units over past two decades) [hereinafter HOUSING
MARKETS].
10. See John C. Weicher, Private Production: Has the Rising Tide Lifted All Boats?, in HOUSING
AMERICA'S POOR 45, 45-51 (Peter Salins ed., 1987) (detailing continuing improvements in housing
quality and size for poor and minorities). But see William C. Apgar, Jr., Recent Trends in Housing
Quality and Affordability: A Reassessment, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990s 37 (Sara Rosenberry &
Chester Hartman eds., 1989) (concluding that "improvement in housing conditions has stalled in the
period since 1974").
11. John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970-1990, 4
Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 253, 265 (1993).
12. Id. at 263 (stating that in 1990, 80% of those in tracts with at least 40% poverty rates were
black or Hispanic). Even after controlling for housing affordability, both blacks and Hispanics are
disproportionately concentrated in the central city. Margery Austin Turner & Ron Wienk, The
Persistence of Segregation in Urban Areas: Contributing Causes, in HOUSING MARKETS, supra note 9,
at 193, 197 (stating that 41% of low-cost housing units in central city are occupied by blacks compared
to only 13% of suburban housing units in same price range).
13. EDWIN S. MILLS & BRUCE W. HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS 313-21 (1989). Compare
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (claiming that flight of black middle-class is important cause of concentration
of black poor) with Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass, 96 AM. J. SOC. 329 (1990) (asserting that racial segregation is better explanation for
concentration of black poverty).
14. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 497, 504-17 (1993) (describing historical patterns of discrimination in siting of public housing).
15. In a national study of paired testers, blacks and Hispanics experienced a 53% and 46% chance
respectively of experiencing discrimination when investigating any single advertised apartment for rent.
MARGERY AuSIN TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 42 (1991).
16. ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, "NOT IN MYBACK
YARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 2-1 to 2-14 (1991).
17. Keith R. Ihlandfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Impact of Job Decentralization on the Economic
Welfare of Central City Blacks, 26 J. URB. ECON. 110, 125 (1989).
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The concentration of the poor in central cities creates a number of serious
social problems. In poor urban areas, children often attend schools of low
quality,19 and adults tend to lack access to employment opportunities,
especially to suburban jobs in the service sector.' The resulting social
dynamics exacerbate behavioral problems such as educational failure,2
detachment from the labor force, ' teen-age pregnancy,23 substance abuse,24
and violent crime.'I In turn, these social problems increase the class bias,
racism, and fear of the middle class toward the minority poor, thus accelerating
middle class flight to exclusionary suburbs.
B. Analytical Framework
In light of the housing problems of the low-income poor, two major
objectives must guide federal low-income rental housing policies. First, policies
should help poor households lower their rent burden while living in housing of
adequate quality. Second, policies should allow the voluntary movement of
poor households out of high poverty areas.
18. See, e.g., John D. Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW URBAN
REALITY 33, 61 (Paul Peterson ed., 1985) (stating that urban social service delivery perpetuates
concentration of inner-city poor).
19. COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CHILDREN IN NEED: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
FOR THE EDUCATIONALLY DISADVANTAGED 39-40 (1987) (stating that inner-city public schools lack
resources and employ poor pedagogy).
20. Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 795, 800
(1991) (stating that the weight of evidence confirms that location of inner-city poor households,
especially black households in urban North and Midwest, constrains their ability to escape from
poverty). If poor families move from areas of concentrated poverty to higher income areas, their
educational attainment and employment rates increase significantly. For example, the Gautreaux Assisted
Housing Program in Chicago allocated demand-side subsidies to poor households who were assigned
to urban areas or wealthier suburbs in a mostly random fashion. Significant educational and employment
benefits accrued to those households moving to the suburbs. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp.
665, 668-69 (N.D. M. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); James
E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education,
and Social Integrationfor Low-Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (1993) (describing study
methodology); James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, The (-autreaux Program: An Experiment in
Racial and Economic Integration, 1 THE CENTER REPORT: CURRENT POLICY ISSUES 2-3 (1990)
(presenting data showing that suburban movers demonstrated significant employment and educational
advantages over urban movers).
21. Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out
and Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1226 (1991).
22. Douglas S. Massey et al., Segregation, the Concentration of Poverty, and the Life Chances of
Individuals, 20 SOC. SCI. RES. 397, 409-11 (1991).
23. D. P. Hogan & E. M. Kitagawa, The Impact of Social Status, Fami Structure and
Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black Adolescents, 90 AM. J. SOC. 825 (1985).
24. ANNE C. CASE & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE COMPANY YOU KEEP: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY
AND NEIGHBORHOOD ON DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS 19 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 3705, 1991).
25. Id.
26. An alternative second objective could be to force certain poor households to move to higher-
income neighborhoods. Forced dispersion, however, would anger many poor people, and it would
probably provoke even more resistance among receiving neighborhoods tln have programs ofvoluntary
dispersion. For a description of neighborhood reaction to a voluntary mobility policy, see Mariano, infra
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In addition to these two objectives of housing affordability and residential
choice, several principles also must shape rental housing policies. First, sound
rental housing policies should be cost-effective to implement. Second, they
should promote horizontal equity, treating similarly-situated households
equally. Third, they should promote vertical equity, or progressivity, by
providing more assistance to poorer households than to households with higher
income. Fourth, they should not stigmatize recipients of assistance. Fifth,
rental housing policies should not create significant work disincentives through
indirect taxes on earnings.
These principles are not an exhaustive list, but they do suggest the range
of inquiry necessary for an effective evaluation of low-income rental housing
policies. Obviously, many tensions exist among the stated objectives and
principles. For example, a cost-effective program providing very small
subsidies to each household would not promote residential choice, because poor
households would remain unable to rent more expensive apartments in better
neighborhoods. Similarly, a progressive policy that provides less assistance to
people as their incomes increase will necessarily generate work disincentives.
Because of several such inherent tensions, no rental housing program will be
able to maximize all of the above goals.
Nonetheless, this Note demonstrates how federal rental housing policies for
low-income families can best fulfill the major objectives of limiting rent
burdens and promoting residential choice for the poor while satisfying the
subsidiary principles to the greatest extent possible. In order to narrow the
scope of inquiry, this Note concentrates on federal rental housing policy for
low-income, able-bodied recipients in metropolitan areas.27 Even with this
narrowed mission, however, it covers a wide range of issues relating to the
Section 8 program and proposes several important reforms.
II. POTENTIAL OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES
This Part presents a brief historical overview of the evolution of the Section
8 program, and it compares demand-side and supply-side housing policies
generally. It concludes that a well-designed demand-side rental housing
program would help reduce the nation's urban housing problems. In particular,
such a policy would be more cost-effective and more conducive to residential
choice than public housing and other supply-side programs.
A. Overview of Federal Rental Housing Policy
Federal policy addressing the problems of low-income households who rent
note 207 (describing suburban resistance to special Section 8 mobility program).
27. This Note therefore does not address home-ownership programs; state or local housing policies;
housing for the elderly or disabled; or rural housing issues.
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apartments historically has consisted of two strategies. First, the federal
government has employed supply-side policies, such as public housing and
project-based assistance,29 that directly increase the number of affordable
housing units in the public and private markets. Beginning with the Housing
Act of 1937,30 which created public housing, national low-income rental
policy was exclusively supply-side for several decades.3
The second and more recent federal approach has been the demand-side
household-based Section 8 program, which provides funding assistance to
households who choose among existing housing units in the private market.
After the turbulent events of the late 1960s, many housing experts and policy
makers began to advocate demand-side policies. By promoting residential
choice, demand-side policies supposedly would help disperse the inner-city
poor and induce housing quality improvements.32 At the urging of the Nixon
Administration, Congress established the Experimental Housing Allowance
Program (EHAP) in 1970.11 In 1974, Congress added to the, National Housing
Act several new housing programs,34 including household-based Section 8.11
Household-based Section 8 assistance has become an increasingly important
component of national housing policy.36 In 1995, the program subsidized
approximately 1.5 million housing units, compared to 1.4 million units in the
conventional public housing program, and 1.8 million in other project-based
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1995). See Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD Conventional PublicHousing,
Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing Programs: Part I: Conventional Public
Housing, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 782 (1991) [hereinafter Fuchs 1].
29. Project-based assistance attaches tenant rental subsidies to specific units built and managed by
private actors. § 1437f (1995). See Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD Conventional Public Housing,
Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing Programs: Part H: Section 8 Existing
Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 990 (1991) [hereinafter Fuchs
M".
30. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1995).
31. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Raymond J. Strmyk, Origins of an Experimental Approach, in
HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 23-27 (Raymond J.
Struyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds., 1981) (describing history of congressional consideration of demand-
side proposals). In 1965, Congress established the Section 23 leasing program and the rent supplement
program, both of which helped tenants rent privately-owned housing units. Under these programs,
however, subsidized tenants generally could not choose their own apartments because the subsidies were
tied to specific units. See id. at 26-27.
32. PRESIDENT'S COMMnTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME: THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMrrrEE ON URBAN HOUSING 47-48 (1968) (known as the Kaiser Committee Report).
33. Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 504. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3 (1970). Policy makers used the results of the
EHAP demand experiments to develop and refine the Section 8 household-based subsidy program. See
Marc Bendick, Jr. & Anne D. Squire, The Three Experiments, in HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE POOR:
LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 51, 57-58 (Raymond J. Struyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds.,
1981) (describing demand experiments).
34. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1995); 24 C.F.R. Part 982 (1996). Note that the Section8 housing program
also includes several supply-side programs including new construction, substantial and moderate
rehabilitation, and project-based existing housing. 24 C.F.R. Parts 880, 881, 882, 983 (1996).
36. From 1977 to 1994, the proportion of all federally-assisted renters receiving household-based
subsidies increased from 8% to 28%. GREEN BOOK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK 819 (1994).
Vol. 14:287, 1996
Section 8 Rental Assistance
programs. 37
In fact, both the Clinton Administration and Congress have plans to
increase the role that Section 8 subsidies will play in federal housing policy.
Under the Administration plan, for example, HUD would roll all project-based
assistance, including public housing, into one housing certificate program to
assist low-income households in paying rent and obtaining mortgages. A
complete nationwide transition to household-based aid would occur within six
years.3" Similarly, a Republican bill that has passed the Senate would provide
residents of distressed public housing with demand-side subsidies to use
anywhere in the private rental market.
39
B. Advantages of Demand-Side Housing Programs
If it were structured appropriately, a demand-side program like Section 8
would be better than supply-side housing strategies in several respects. A sound
demand-side housing program would be a comparatively inexpensive4 policy
to provide poor families access to many moderately priced housing opportuni-
ties throughout metropolitan areas."' Although the economic effects of a large
demand-side program are complex, one thorough study has concluded that "at
least at a qualitative level, a rent subsidy policy would on balance have positive
efficiency and equity consequences. Program participants would be aided with
little likelihood of severe, unintended housing market repercussions."42
Meanwhile, supply-side policies, despite their name, are generally inefficient
at increasing the supply of low-income housing.43
37. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Vouching for the Poor, 27 NAT'L J. 1094, 1095 (1995).
38. Departments of Veterans' Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations for 1996: Hearings before the Subcomm. for Veterans' Affairs, Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 26 (May 2, 1995) (statement of Henry G. Cisneros, Sec., HUD) (describing Administration's
proposal).
39. S. 1260, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 120 (1996) (requiring conversion of distressed public
housing to tenant-based assistance).
40. Schill, supra note 14, at 537-38 (concluding that virtually all empirical studies agree that
certificates and vouchers are cheaper than supply-side programs); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 11 (1988) (stating that 20-
year cost of a public housing unit is more than twice the cost of providing certificates or vouchers); U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WILL IT COST MORE TO REPLACE PUBLIC HOUSING WITH
CERTIFICATES? (Issue Brief No. 1, 1995) (stating that Section 8 portable certificates are cheaper than
public housing even if capital and modernization expenses of public housing are not considered).
41. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
42. JEROME ROTHENBERG Er AL., THE MAZE OF URBAN HOUSING MARKETS: THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND POLICY 300-01 (1991). Because a demand-side program would reduce demand for very low quality
housing, owners of such buildings might tend to abandon them. Id. at 296. To avoid this problem, a
demand-side program could be supplemented by a carefully targeted supply-side program that provides
upgrading subsidies for these buildings. Id. at 301.
43. Weicher, supra note 10, at 59 ("[S]ubsidized housing production is in large part a substitute
for private production that would probably have occurred without the program. The two most detailed
studies, by Michael Murray and Craig Swan, conclude that most public housing has simply replaced
private new construction in the long run, although the substitution effect takes a few years."); see also
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Perhaps most important, a well-designed demand-side housing program
would be a superior means of promoting residential choice for low-income and
minority households. If a demand-side program provides sufficient rental
subsidies and housing search assistance, then recipient households can choose
among housing options in higher-income urban and suburban neighborhoods.
In contrast, public housing and other supply-side policies generally limit
recipients to subsidized buildings in poorer and less politically powerful
neighborhoods.' Furthermore, unlike many recipients of supply-side
subsidies, recipients of a truly mobile demand-side subsidy would not bear the
social stigma of residing in housing complexes created for the poor.45
A demand-side housing program, therefore, can be a mobility strategy"
to promote racial and socioeconomic integration throughout metropolitan
areas.47 Of course, many poor residents with demand-side subsidies may still
face obstacles to residential choice, including racial discrimination and the lack
of public transportation in suburban areas. Nonetheless, providing mobile rental
subsidies and housing search assistance to poor families could be an important
step toward reversing the increasing residential segregation of the minority
poor. Moreover, a demand-side housing policy and other mobility programs
would complement remote employment and place-based policies48 and help to
ROTHENBERG Er AL., supra note 42, at 309-33 (detailing inefficiencies of supply-side new construction
and rehabilitation programs).
44. Although households with demand-side subsidies may not be welcomed in some exclusionary
neighborhoods, these individual families probably generate less antipathy than do supply-side multi-
family housing structures. See Mary A. Davis, Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program 2 (May 20-21,
1991) (unpublished manuscript submitted to the Urban Institute for its Urban Opportunity Conference
on Housing Markets and Residential Mobility, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review) (stating that
siting supply-side housing programs for the poor often proves difficult in suburban and middle-income
neighborhoods because of political opposition); Schill, supra note 14, at 504-17 (describing patterns of
discrimination in siting of public housing); see also John C. Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate,
in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS: HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLICY 263, 277 (Denise DiPasquale & Langley
C. Keyes eds., 1990) ("Production programs are sometimes favored over existing housing programs
because they circumvent the problem of discrimination and directly provide minorities with access to
decent housing. Production programs can certainly achieve these objectives, but the record of Section
8 New Construction indicates that success is not automatic.").
45. Although some supply-side projects reduce the stigmatization problem by incorporating middle-
class tenants, this strategy is quite costly and results in scarce subsidy dollars being given to the less
poor. Barbara Sard, The Massachusetts Experience with Targeted Tenant-Based Rental Assistance for
the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy for Socially Disfavored Groups, Part H, I GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POvERTY 216, 218 (1994) [hereinafter Sard H].
46. Other mobility programs include reducing exclusionary land use regulations to allow multi-
family housing in suburban areas, providing better public transportation and day care services in higher-
income suburban and urban neighborhoods, and strictly enforcing anti-discrimination laws.
47. Some assert that dispersionist housing programs are dangerous because they may diminish the
political power and cultural bonds of minorities. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing v. Fair
Housing: The Problems with Providing Increased Housing Opportunities through Spatial Decon-
centration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSEREV. 7,9-12 (1980). Housing mobility programs, however, provide real
and dramatic benefits to assisted households and thus allow poor residents to decide for themselves the
importance of larger political and cultural objectives.
48. Remote employment policies provide inner-city workers with access to jobs in higher-income
urban or suburban areas. See, e.g., Mark A. Hughes, Antipoverty Strategy Where the Rubber Meets the
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reverse the economic decline associated with the urban concentration of
poverty.
49
A sound demand-side housing program should lie at the center of the
federal government's rental housing policy. Note several caveats, however.
First, the success of a demand-side program depends on its design. For
example, a poorly structured demand-side policy that does not ensure housing
mobility would not help reduce the concentration of poverty. Indeed, if the
policy neither encouraged mobility nor provided strong incentives for rent
bargaining, it would cause inflation in low-income rental housing markets, thus
harming those poor people not receiving rental subsidies5 0 Second, demand-
side programs alone may be inadequate in housing markets that lack a
sufficient supply of adequate housing for reasons such as local rent control or
natural disaster. Third, the general advantages of demand-side policies do not
justify a hasty termination of existing supply-side programs. In particular, a
quick end to direct subsidization of public housing units could unnecessarily
rmin certain housing projects not yet ready to compete on the market and could
provoke rapid decline of urban neighborhoods.51 Nonetheless, a well-
structured demand-side program is an important means to promote affordable
housing and residential choice for low-income urban families.
Im. OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSEHOLD-BASED PROGRAM
Does the current Section 8 program achieve the potential benefits of
demand-side housing strategies? To prepare the groundwork necessary to
answer this question, this Part describes the administrative structure of Section
8 policy as it exists in February 1996. Section 8 policy actually consists of two
Road: Transporting Workers to Jobs, in HOUSING MARKERs, supra note 9, at 283, 296-307 (giving
examples of successful reverse commute programs). Place-based policies provide resources to low-
income areas for objectives such as education, crime prevention, health care, housing, and economic
development.
49. Reducing the concentration of poverty through residential mobility should stimulate economic
development and residential growth, enhance job opportunities for remaining households, and increase
per capita tax revenue that could be used to fund community services. Schill, supra note 20, at 816-17;
see also Edwin S. Mills, Open Housing Laws as Stimulus to Central City Employment, 17 J. URB.
EcON. 184, 188 (1985) (presenting evidence that facilitating black suburbanization may increase
employment and residential growth in central cities).
50. Well-designed demand-side subsidies cause recipients to move from low-quality to moderate-
quality housing, thus decreasing the price of low-quality housing. ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN, URBAN
ECONOMICS 447-49 (1993). However, if recipient households are not able to rent in neighborhoods with
moderate-quality housing and if the subsidy is not structured to encourage recipient households to
bargain down rents with their landlords, then low-quality housing prices would actually increase.
51. See Restructuring the Federal Government: Hearings before the Subcomm. for VeteransAffairs,
Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1035 (Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Gordon Cavanaugh on behalf of the Council
of Large Public Housing Authorities) (describing HUD transition plan away from public housing as
"poorly conceived and disastrous" because it would "jeopardize the housing plant and leave housing
hulks to blight neighborhoods").
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similar programs known as the certificate and voucher programs. Both
programs allocate resources to PHAs, allowing them to assist certain poor
households in renting apartments in the private market.52 PHAs establish
selection and waitlist priorities according to federal and local regulations, as
described below. Once a household qualifies for assistance, it generally has 60
days to find a landlord willing to accept the subsidy, or else it loses its
opportunity and must move to the bottom of the PHA waiting list.53 If an
owner agrees to lease to a Section 8 enrollee, the PHA inspects the apartment
for compliance with federal housing quality standards and reviews the lease to
ensure that it meets federal standards.' If the apartment and lease are
satisfactory, the PHA signs a Housing Assistance Payment contract with the
owner,55 in which the PHA agrees to pay the owner a fixed monthly amount
according to formulae described below. The PHA subsequently conducts rent
adjustments, 56 housing reinspections, 57 and income reexaminations.
51 HUD
reimburses the PHA for the subsidy and administrative costs.
59
The original Section 8 program, still predominant today,' is known as the
certificate program. Households with certificates generally may only lease
apartments which have gross rents:6" 1) at or below the local Fair Market
Rent (FMR) established by HJD;62 and 2) reasonable under local market
conditions and not in excess of comparable unassisted units.63 The PHA pays
to the landlord a subsidy representing the difference between the contract rent
and 30% of the household's monthly adjusted gross income.61 The PHA also
52. Section 8 certificates are largely household-based, but the PHA may use up to fifteen percent
of its certificate resources on project-based assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(2)(A) (1995).
53. The PHA also has the discretion to extend the search term up to 60 additional days. 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.303(b)(1) (1996).
54. Id. at § 982.305.
55. Id. at § 982.451.
56. Id. at §§ 882.108 (certificate), 887.353(b) (voucher).
57. Id. at §§ 982.153(11), 982.405(a).
58. Id. at § 982.153(15).
59. Id. at § 982.151.
60. In 1995, the household-based certificate program assisted approximately 1,142,000 households,
while the voucher program assisted about 324,500 households. Telephone interview with Billy Hall, staff
member, HUD Rental Assistance Division (Feb. 16, 1996).
61. Gross rent is the contract rent plus scheduled amounts for utilities. 24 C.F.R. § 813.102 (1996).
62. The FMR represents the fortieth percentile of local rents of comparably sized units that have
turned over in the last two years. It estimates an appropriate level of contract rent plus utilities, except
telephone service, by evaluating the cost of local housing, excluding public housing units, newly built
units and substandard units. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113 (1996). In certain situations, the PHA may approve
rents higher than the FMR in order to expand housing choice. 24 C.F.R. § 882.106(a) (1996)
(explaining when a PHA may approve exception rent levels at up to 120% of the FMR).
63. 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.106(b)(1) (1996).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (1995). Technically, the PHA pays to the landlord the difference
between the rent and either 30% of monthly adjusted gross income or 10% of monthly gross income,
whichever is greater. In almost all cases, however, 30% of monthly adjusted gross income is larger than
10% of monthly gross income. MIREmLE L. LEGER & STEPHEN D. KENNEDY, I FINAL COMPREHEN-
SIVE REPORT OF THE FREESTANDING HOUSING VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION 15 n.1 (1990) (concluding
that30% adjusted income larger than 10% gross income for 99.4% of Demonstration's 7,605 certificate
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pays a utility allowance to either the landlord or subsidy recipient.'
The voucher program6 is similar to the certificate program in many
respects, but it has a different payment structure. 67 The PHA establishes a
voucher payment standard schedule based on unit size, roughly equivalent to
the FMR.' The PHA normally pays to the owner the difference between the
payment standard and 30% of the family's monthly adjusted income.6 9 The
PHA payment to the owner, however, may not be more than the amount by
which the actual rent to the owner (plus an applicable utility allowance)
exceeds 10% of the family's monthly gross income.70 Unlike certificate
holders, therefore, households with vouchers do not always pay 30% of their
adjusted income for rent. If a unit rents for less than the payment standard, a
household with a voucher benefits by paying less than 30% of its adjusted
income for rent, subject to the minimum rent computation. On the other hand,
if a unit rents for more than the payment standard, a household with a voucher
may rent the unit by paying more than 30% of its adjusted income for rent.
Eligibility for the certificate and voucher programs is generally limited to
"very low-income" families whose annual income does not exceed 50% of the
median income for the area, adjusted for family size. Certain exceptions exist
for certain "low-income" families, with annual incomes less than 80% of
adjusted median income, who have been displaced from other housing
programs. 1 Until recently, PHAs also were required to issue at least 90% of
household-based subsidies to federal preference holders,72 defined as eligible
households that were paying more than 50% of family income for rent, were
living in substandard housing, or had been involuntarily displaced from their
housing.' PHAs could implement their own systems of admission priorities,
known as local preferences, provided that their prioritization schemes do not
recipients). Adjusted gross income represents total income minus specified deductions. 24 C.F.R.
§ 913.102 (1996).
65. 24 C.F.R. § 813.108 (1996).
66. The voucher program was enacted as a demonstration in 1983 and authorized permanently in
1987. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1178, 1181-1183 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)
(1995)); Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1849-
1853, 1878, 1890.
67. Note that a recent law imposes minimum rents of between $25 and $50 on both certificate and
voucher recipients. 1996 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 402(a), 110 Stat.
26 (1996).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(1) (1995); 24 C.F.R. § 887.351 (1996) (stating that payment standard
may not be less than 80% of the FMR, nor more than either FMR or HUD-approved communitywide
exception rent).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (1995); 24 C.F.R. § 887.353(a)(1) (1996).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (1995); 24 C.F.R. § 887.353(a)(2) (1996).
71. 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(a)(ii) (1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1995).
72. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(b) (1996).
73. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(a)(2) (1996). The PHAs could determine the relative weight of the federal
preferences. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(a)(3)(ii) (1996). About half of unassisted very low-income families
could qualify for federal preferences, largely because they spent more than half their income on rent.
Sard II, supra note 45, at 184.
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conflict with the federal preference system or fair housing laws.74 The 1996
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, however, abolished the system of federal
preferences,7' but it continues to allow PHAs to employ local preferences.
A PHA may deny or terminate assistance only on grounds specifically
identified in the regulations. For example, it may refuse to assist a household
that owes money to the PHA, has committed fraud in a housing assistance
program, has breached program rules, or has engaged in drug-related or violent
criminal activities.76 On the other hand, it may not deny assistance to a
household which is a poor housekeeper, has a bad rent paying history, has
previously been evicted, or has unfavorable landlord references. 7
Section 8 households tend to be poor families with children. Recipient
households have an average annual income of less than $800078 and receive
annual housing subsidies of about $4800.19 About 60% of the households have
children.80
Over 2500 PHAs administer household-based subsidies, assisting low-
income households in every state and metropolitan area."' Most PHAs serve
a single city or county and also operate public housing programs. In addition,
137 state and regional PHAs with multi-county service areas provide assistance
to approximately 220,000 families.8Y
IV. ENSURING EQUITY
Although household-based Section 8 has the potential to dramatically
enhance the lives of poor people, it suffers from fundamental flaws that cause
certain groups of potential recipients to be denied assistance unfairly.
Remedying these problems requires radical solutions, including targeting
assistance more narrowly and reducing failure rates by relaxing program rules.
A. Targeting Assistance More Narrowly
The federal eligibility rules for Section 8 certificate and voucher programs
are fundamentally unfair. First, the rules set an upper income limit of 50% of
area median income, adjusted for family size. Under this provision, many
74. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.207(g) (1996).
75. 1996 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 402(d), 110 Stat. 26 (1996)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(d)(1)(A), 1437f(o)(3)(B)).
76. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(a) (1996).
77. Fuchs II, supra note 29, at 992.
78. Jim McTague, So Long, Projects? Clinton Wants More Housing Vouchers for the Poor,
BARRON'S, Feb. 6, 1995, at 18 (examining voucher recipients).
79. OFFICE OF POL'Y DEv. & REs., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV., SECTION 8
ADMIMSrMATWE FEES: A REPORT TO CONGRES 6 (1994) [hereinafter HUD: ADMINSTRATIvE FEES]
(1993 estimate).
80. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 45 (1989 estimate).
81. HUD: ADMINSrRATIvE FEES, supra note 79, at 1.
82. Id. at 5.
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households with incomes far above the poverty line receive assistance.' At
the same time, because of funding limitations, only about one-third of very low
income households actually receive federal rental subsidies.' 4 The current
structure therefore violates concepts of vertical and horizontal equity.
Second, both the old and revised rules concerning assistance priorities
among households are inadequate. Because the Section 8 program is not an
entitlement program, it does not ensure housing assistance for all eligible
households. Instead, poor families must often wait months, or even years, on
PHA waiting lists in order to receive assistance.' Under the old system of
federal preferences, PHAs were required to give priority status to three
categories of applicants: those paying more than 50% of family income for
housing, those living in substandard housing (including the homeless), and
those involuntarily displaced from housing.86 Recently, however, Congress
eliminated the federal preference system entirely.'
The old federal preference system created unfortunate inequities among
poor households. For example, the preference for families with high rent
burdens inadvertently penalized those families who had tried to make ends meet
by renting units of somewhat inadequate quality or size, or in undesirable
neighborhoods, rather than renting more expensive units that they could not
afford.88 These families could end up waiting years on the PHA waiting list,
while other households (including those with incomes near 50% of area median
income, or nearly twice the poverty line)89 rented overly-expensive apartments
and obtained priority housing status. Similarly, the federal preference for
households living in housing of substandard quality created perverse incentives
for households to take advantage of the system in order to avoid long stints on
waiting lists.90
83. Nationally, the poverty level is roughly equivalent to 35% of area median income. Kathryn P.
Nelson& Jill Khadduri, To Whom Should Limited Housing Resources Be Directed?, 3 HoUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 1, 3 (1992).
84. Together, all federal rental housing programs assisted just over 4 million households in 1989.
Over 8.5 million households with incomes less than 50% of area median income were not served.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at xii, xiv.
85. For a description of a typical PHA waitist, see Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments
Program: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (Nov. 3, 1993)
(testimony of Alyce Flanary on behalf of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials) (stating that in Belton, Texas, the average wait for Section 8 assistance was between two and
three years in 1992).
86. See supra notes 72-73.
87. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
88. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 50.
89. See Sard I, supra note 45, at 197 n.10 (stating that in 1993 the federal poverty level for a
family of three was $11,980, while 50% of area median income for same family in Boston was
$23,050).
90. Although it may seem offensive to speak of people purposefully becoming homeless or moving
into housing of inadequate quality, a Section 8 subsidy represents a large prize that certainly could
induce voluntary displacement. Comprehensive longitudinal data from New York City confirms that
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Although Congress was justified in ending preferences based on high rent
burden and inadequate housing quality, it inappropriately terminated the
preference for involuntarily displaced households. This preference ensured
relatively rapid housing assistance for poor households who had lost their
homes because of natural disaster, government redevelopment activities, a
landlord's commercial conversion of the apartment, hate crimes, or other
causes.9" By abolishing this preference, Congress abdicated its responsibility
to the nation's neediest families.
A better eligibility standard would target federal rental housing assistance
more narrowly than the current system, perhaps to households with incomes
below 35% of area median income, 91 while restoring the preference for
involuntarily displaced households. Given budget constraints, the proposed
policy would still only serve a portion of the eligible population. Nonetheless,
by concentrating resources on a smaller pool of households, lowering the
income limit would help reduce the horizontal and vertical equity problems
inherent in the current system.93 Moreover, this proposal would protect the
most vulnerable poor families who become homeless through no fault of their
own.
linking homelessness to priority for permanent housing led to a substantial increase in the homeless
population, a conclusion reached by many observers including Nancy Wackstein, a former advocate for
the homeless who headed the Mayor's Office on Homelessness and SRO Housing before resigning in
frustration. Thomas Main, Hard Lessons on Homelessness: The Education ofDavid Dinldns, 3 CrrY J.
30 (Summer 1993) (describing rise in homeless population after policy change). But see Stanley S. Herr
& Stephen M. B. Pincus, A Way to Go Home: Supportive Housing and Housing Assistance Preferences
for the Homeless, 23 STETSON L.R. 345 (1994) (advocating preferences for homeless).
91. 24 C.F.R. § 880.615 (1996).
92. See Nelson & Khadduri, supra note 83, at 30 (stating that concentration of housing problems
among extremely low-income households implies that income limits for all rental assistance should be
reduced to around 35% of median income). Of course, imposing any income limit on Section 8
recipients creates the "notch effect" common to means-tested social welfare policies. By denying housing
subsidies to families with incomes above a certain level, the program creates severe work disincentives
for families with incomes just below the income limit. Policies to reduce these disincentives could
include a graduated reduction in benefits as a family's income approaches the income limit, a system
of earned-income disregards, and a policy requiring community service for unemployed adults receiving
housing subsidies. One existing program to create work incentives among some recipients of Section
8 subsidies is the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program. 42 U.S.C. § 1437u (1995). See 24 C.F.R.
§ 984.102 (1996) ("Under the FSS program, low-income families are provided opportunities for
education, job training, counseling, and other forms of social service assistance, while living in assisted
housing, so that they may obtain the education, employment, and business and social skills necessary
to achieve self-sufficiency .... ).
93. Two arguments might be advanced against lowering the income eligibility level. First, limiting
the Section 8 program to the extremely poor might further weaken political support for the program.
R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT & URBAN HOUsING 171 (1985). But see Nelson &
Khadduri, supra note 92, at 51 (criticizing efforts to devote scarce housing resources to less needy).
Second, assuming that higher-income households are better tenants than are lower-income households,
lowering the income limit might expose landlords to less responsible tenants and decrease landlords'
participation in the program. Other reforms suggested in this Note, however, should dramatically
increase landlord participation, even with a poorer pool of Section 8 households. Also, lowering the
income eligibility level would have the advantage of not depleting inner-city neighborhoods of higher-
income households.
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B. Reducing Failure Rates
Another major defect in the Section 8 program is that certain program
enrollees fail to find adequate housing within the required time limit. A
household may spend years on the PHA waiting list only to be given sixty
days94 in which to find an apartment. If the household fails to identify an
available unit that satisfies housing quality standards and federal rent
requirements in the appropriate time period, it loses its eligibility for Section
8. If the household has not become entirely frustrated with the program, it
would have to reapply for benefits and wait its turn again. Studies indicate that
substantial failure rates exist around the country. A national study conducted
from 1985 to 1987 found failure rates of 35% for the voucher program and
39% for the certificate program. 95 Another study conducted in 1993 showed
a combined failure rate of 18%.9
HUD officials mistakenly claim that the 1993 study demonstrates that high
failure rates are no longer a problem.' This assertion, however, is incorrect
for several reasons. First, the results of the 1993 study do not actually indicate
that failure rates have decreased from the 1985-1987 study. Given the small
overlap in PHAs included in both samples and the variability in their failure
rates, the difference between the studies is not statistically significant."s
Additionally, experts believe that a temporary looseness in the rental housing
market may have caused the most recent drop in failure rates." Moreover,
even according to the 199.3 study, failure rates remain particularly high in
certain metropolitan housing markets. The New York City failure rate in 1993,
for example, was thirty-eight percent.1to
Finally, even an eighteen percent failure rate is unacceptably high because
the households that fail to find apartments are often those households most in
need of assistance. Data from both Section 8 and EHAP studies indicate that
"large families, single-parent households, and minority households are more
likely than other groups to live in substandard housing" that does not meet
94. PHAs have the discretion, but not the obligation, to extend the time limit for households
actively seeking housing. See supra note 53.
95. LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 49.
96. STEPHEN D. KENNEDY & MERYL FINKEL, SECTION 8 RENTAL VOUCHER AND RENTAL
CERTIFICATE UTILZATION STUDY: FINAL REPORT 6 (1994).
97. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFHOUS. & URB. DEv., TENANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE WORKS
(Issue Brief No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter HUD: TENANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE WORKS].
98. See KENNEDY & FINKEL, supra note 96, at ii.
99. Id. at Foreword. Section 8 Directors in PHAs attributed the decreased failure rates to looser
rental markets. Although Census data on vacancy rates do not seem to support this conclusion, the data
are for the entire Metropolitan Statistical Area and thus do not reflect the portion of the market relevant
for Section 8. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
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program quality standards.' Because of the quality standards imposed by the
Section 8 program, these households do not have the option of leasing their
current apartments but instead must try to find adequate housing elsewhere.
Unfortunately, these families often face substantial discrimination in the private
housing market."r Therefore, families who live in poor quality housing when
they become eligible for Section 8 assistance are much more likely than
families in adequate housing to lose their Section 8 subsidy by failing to find
a qualifying apartment. 3 As currently implemented, the household-based
Section 8 program violates the principle of progressivity because it fails to help
those households most in need of assistance.
Several appropriate policy reforms would contribute to reduced failure
rates. In the context of improving housing mobility, Part V will describe four
such proposals: 1) the Section 8 program should improve PHAs' incentives to
offer quality housing counseling and landlord outreach; 2) the program should
allow enrolled households more time to search for an apartment; 3) the
government should deregulate certain aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship
in order to induce higher landlord participation, thus making the housing search
easier for enrolled households; and 4) the program should include strict anti-
discrimination policies to discourage landlords from flatly denying rental
opportunities to Section 8 recipients.
These reforms, however, may not eliminate qualifying failures for those
households facing intense discrimination in the local housing market, or for
those households that are unable or unwilling to engage in an intensive housing
search throughout the area. Policy makers should therefore consider a radical
(and surely controversial) reform: the elimination of the housing quality and
inspection system altogether for all able-bodied recipients (thus excluding the
elderly and disabled), who would then be expected to make their own
determinations regarding housing quality.
Paradoxically, the housing quality and inspection system, though designed
to protect tenants, has actually harmed many of the poorest families. As
101. Rachel G. Bratt, The Housing Payments Program: Its Possible Effects on Minorities, Poor,
40 J. HOUSING 108, 109 (1983); see also Garland E. Allen et al., The Experimental Housing Allowance
Program, in Do HOUSING ALLOWANCES WORK? 1, 25-26 (Katharine L. Bradbury & Anthony Downs
eds., 1981) (stating that EHAP housing requirements induced high failure rates among minority, poor
and large households because of quality of their original housing).
102. See MARGARET C. SIMS, FAMILIES AND HOUSING MARKETS: OBSTACLES TO LOCATING
SUITABLE HOUSING 40-42 (1980) (citing studies showing rental discrimination against large families);
TURNER Er AL., supra note 15, at 42 (demonstrating high rates of racial discrimination in rental
markets).
103. See LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 46 (reporting 58% failure rates among households
with severely inadequate original housing, 37% for those in moderately inadequate units, and 26% for
those in adequate units); LORENE YAP Er AL., LOWER INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(SECTION 8): NATIONWIDE EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM: TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT 191 (1978) (indicating that 34% of those denied Section 8 assistance despite qualifying for
certificate said that "finding a unit that would pass Section 8 inspection" was major problem).
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described above, families who live in poor quality housing are much more
likely than families in adequate housing to lose their Section 8 subsidy by
failing to find a qualifying apartment. Without the inspection requirement,
households who are unable to locate housing that meets the federal guidelines
would at least not lose their valuable subsidies.
Abolishing housing quality standards and inspections is unlikely to harm the
health or safety of program participants for several reasons. First, the federal
housing quality and inspection system has proven quite ineffective. For
example, PHAs that operate project-based Section 8 units often fail to conduct
inspections properly. According to the HUD Inspector General, for example,
nationwide in 1993 only thirty-nine percent of the required inspections of
project-based Section 8 units were actually conducted. 1°4 Administrative
problems and shortages of inspectors are among the causes of this prob-
lem.105
Moreover, a sophisticated empirical comparison between subsidized
households with and without required inspections indicate that inspections have
little effect on housing quality."° These data suggest that able-bodied
households are generally quite capable of identifying quality housing. In
removing minimum housing standards from its demand-side subsidy program,
the U.S. would join the ranks of the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 17
Finally, the other proposals in this Note would allay possible negative
effects of an end to inspections. For example, the payment structure reforms
suggested in Part VI would provide incentives for households to shop for better
quality housing. At the same time, the mobility reforms outlined in Part V
would ensure that new Section 8 recipients who did not want to stay in their
original apartments could locate quality housing elsewhere, and that households
could move from their existing dwellings if conditions deteriorate. In this
context, ending the inspection system would allow the poorest and most
vulnerable households to take advantage of the large benefits of household-
based subsidies.
104. Serge F. Kovaleski, Landlords Get Hefty Subsidies Despite Substandard Housing, WASH.
POSr, July 27, 1994, at B1.
105. John J. Fialka, U.S. Reports Say Some HUD Projects Are Like Slums Due to Mismanagement,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 1994, at B9.
106. Eric H. Hanushek & John M. Quigley, Consumption Aspects, in Do HOUSING ALLOWANCES
WORK? 185, 229 (Katharine L. Bradbury & Anthony Downs eds., 1981) (analyzing EHAP data and
concluding that "[w]hen the housing improvements for the constrained housing group are compared with
the changes observed for the control group and the unconstrained group, the improvements appear rather
small").
107. E. JAY HOWENSrINE, HOUSING VOUCHERS: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 116
(1986).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 14:287, 1996
V. PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL CHOICE AND MOBILITY
One of the original objectives of household-based Section 8 was to promote
residential choice and mobility among the urban poor. The 1974 Housing and
Community Development Act itself stated that household-based subsidies were
designed to assist in "the reduction of the isolation of income groups within
communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the
diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of
housing opportunities for persons of lower incomes .. .. " 108
Proponents of the Section 8 household-based subsidy program claim that it
has succeeded in fulfilling this objective."e A comprehensive examination of
existing evidence, however, indicates that the program has generally been
unsuccessful in this regard. This Part examines the current obstacles preventing
Section 8 recipients from exercising residential choice and proposes a number
of policies to promote mobility.
A. Constrained Mobility Among Section 8 Recipients
Many families that receive Section 8 household-based subsidies would like
to move to areas of higher income and lower minority concentration. A study
in Hartford indicated that 68 % of all Section 8 holders were interested in using
their subsidies to move to the suburbs.110 Studies in Boston"' and Chica-
go" 2 also found that a large portion of Section 8 recipients, including
minorities, wanted to move to higher income urban and suburban locations,
where they perceived the quality of life to be high."' Another recent study
revealed that about 87% of black households are willing to move to a
108. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 101(c)(6), 88 Stat. 633 (1974), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6)
(1995).
109. See, e.g., HUD: TENANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE WORKS, supra note 97.
110. KIM McCLAIN & DAVID DESIDERATO, CITIZENS RESEARCH EDUCATION NETWORK,
REGIONAL HOUSING MOBILITY: A SURVEY OF NEED IN HARTFORD 5 (1992).
111. Elizabeth A. Mulroy, Single-Parent Families and the Housing Crisis: Implications for
Macropractice, 35 1. SOCIAL WORK 542, 543 (1990) (stating that nearly all study participants wanted
to relocate using Section 8 subsidies and describing how even those participants who used the subsidies
to lease their current apartments "spent their entire search time trying to access the private rental market
in areas of their preference") (hereinafter Mulroy I).
112. The original evaluation of the Gautreaux mobility program found that about one-half of the
regular Chicago Housing Authority Section 8 participants would have chosen to live in the suburbs if
they had been permitted to move with their subsidies. KATHLEEN A. PEROFF ET AL., THE GAUTREAUX
ASSISTED HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS
173 (1979).
113. "Why would you live there [the projects] when you could move to the suburbs and pay the
same kind of rent.... [In the suburbs I] only have to deal with people who don't like me, right?
They're not doing anything to hurt me as far as I can see. They're not trying to break into my house.
They're not trying to bust my child up the side of his head. They're not trying to lure him into [gangs
and drugs]." Section 8 certificate holder who moved to suburbs, quoted in Rosenbaum et al., supra note
20, at 1541 n.76 (brackets in original).
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neighborhood of twelve white families and only two black families.
114
Moreover, sufficient rental housing suitable for Section 8 recipients exists
throughout entire metropolitan regions. For example, HUD has analyzed
census data for ten metropolitan areas to examine the distribution of rental
housing units that would be affordable under the Section 8 program.
115
Affordable units account for at least thirty percent of the rental stock in over
two-thirds of all residential census tracts in the metropolitan areas. 16 This
estimate is conservative because it does not take into account PHAs' ability to
approve exception rent levels of up to one hundred twenty percent of FMRs in
order to expand housing choice in areas outside of high-poverty census
tracts."1
7
Despite both the eagerness of Section 8 recipients to move and the wide
availability of moderately priced rental housing, Section 8 has not significantly
helped the poor move to higher income neighborhoods. The predecessor to
Section 8, the EHAP demand experiment, found virtually no tendency for
experimental households to move with increased frequency into areas with less
poverty or reduced concentrations of their own racial or ethnic group." 8
Similarly, a Houston study showed that Section 8 did not significantly help
poor minorities to leave poor, minority neighborhoods. 19 Little difference
existed between the minority-percentage of the tracts lived in by certificate
holders who had moved and the minority-percentage of the tracts lived in by
certificate holders who had stayed in place."2 Moreover, few minority
tenants used their Section 8 certificates to move into neighborhoods of low
poverty. 121
114. Reynolds Farley etal., Continued Racial Residential Segregation in Detroit: "Chocolate City,
Vanilla Suburbs" Revisited, 4 J. HOUS. RESEARCH 1, 23 (1993).
115. HUD, TENANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE WORKS, supra note 97 (examining units at or
below fortieth percentile of area rents for standard quality, unsubsidized, recently occupied units); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD REINVENTION: FROM BLUEPRINT TO ACTION 35 (1995)
(stating that housing shortages in most urban housing markets "generally occur at the very low end of
the rental market - well below the Fair Market Rent (FMR) calculated at the fortieth percentile of
recently occupied, good quality units").
116. Id.
117. See supra note 62.
118. Peter Rossi, Residential Mobility, in DO HOUSING ALLOWANCES WORK? 147, 170 (Katharine
L. Bradbury and Anthony Downs eds., 1981); see also Arthur P. Solomon & Chester G. Fenton, The
Nation's First Experience with Housing Allowances: The Kansas City Demonstration, 50 LAND ECON.
213, 220 (1974).
119. Robert D. Bullard, Does Section 8 Promote an Ethnic and Economic Mix?, 35 1. HOUSING
364 (1978).
120. More than 78% of the minority nonmovers were in tracts with 70% or more minority
population, while 70% of the minority movers ended up in these tracts. Id.
121. Less than 10% of the sampled minority households lived in tracts with substantially low
poverty (i.e., less than 5% poverty). By contrast, 40% of white tenants interviewed lived in such low
poverty areas. Id. at 365. More recent data on four metropolitan areas present only somewhat better
results. HUD, FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE SHOULD PROMOTE MOBILITY AND CHOICE (Issue Brief
No. 5, 1995) (citing General Accounting Office study concluding that only 36% of black households
use their Section 8 subsidies in areas that have poverty rates of less than 10%).
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A national study confirms that a household's use of Section 8 causes no
statistically significant change in the minority concentration of its neighbor-
hood."2 Recent data also indicates that a very small percentage of recipients
in urban areas use their subsidies to move to suburban areas." Perhaps
largely as a result of this low mobility, many subsidy recipients remain
dissatisfied with their neighborhood, housing conditions, or both.12
B. Reducing Housing Search Costs
These studies of housing preferences, housing availability, and Section 8
outcomes suggest that the Section 8 program needs improvement. Evidently,
serious obstacles face many Section 8 enrollees who wish to move to higher
income, less minority-concentrated and/or suburban neighborhoods.
A full understanding of these obstacles requires a mobility model that
describes the housing decisions of recipient households. Some social scientists
examining people's housing choices employ descriptive models that separate
the different components of a family's decision-making process. Rossi, for
example, distinguishes between a household's decision to move and its decision
to select a new dwelling. According to this model, the household makes plans
to move when dissatisfaction with housing rises above a certain threshold, and
it subsequently chooses a new dwelling among the alternatives evaluated in the
search."z This model is inadequate, however, to explain Section 8 recipients'
housing decisions, which are not simple and discrete but rather complex and
dynamic. For example, depending on the results of its housing search, a
household that originally wanted to move may nonetheless decide to "lease in
place," meaning that it uses the Section 8 subsidy to help rent its original
apartment.
The following model attempts to capture the dynamic nature of the housing
decisions of families enrolled in Section 8. Consider a household living in an
apartment that rents at a level below the FMR but does not satisfy federal
122. LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 114-15 (stating that changes in minority concentration
of neighborhood were not significant for households of any race). A previous survey found that
recipients of household-based Section 8 subsidies experienced only modest changes in neighborhood
minority concentration after enrolling in the program. Blacks, for example, experienced a mean change
in minority concentration of only -7.8 %, and they eventually resided in neighborhoods that were still
about 48% minority. JAMES E. WALLACE Er AL., PARTICIPATION AND BENEFITS IN THE URBAN
SECTION 8 PROGRAM: NEW CONSTRUCTION AND ExIsnNG HOUSING 247 (1981).
123. Downsizing Government: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Veterans'Affairs, Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 711 (Jan. 24, 1995) (statement of John C. Weicher, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute)
(citing American Housing Survey data showing that only about one-ninth of subsidy recipients move
from cities to suburbs).
124. CONG. BUDGEr OFFICE, supra note 7, at 48 (providing 1989 data showing that 35% of
families with one or two children and 43 % of families with three or more children were dissatisfied with
housing obtained through household-based subsidies).
125. Rossi, supra note 118, at 151.
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quality standards. At the time the household enrolls in the program, it is
dissatisfied with the overall residence'2 and decides that it wants to move
(Step 1). If unsuccessful in its housing search (Step 2b), the family will
reevaluate its search strategy (Step 3b). As the 60 to 120 day deadline
approaches, the family may decide that it should try to stay in its original
apartment in order not to lose the subsidy. It will then attempt to work with the
landlord to upgrade the apartment to federal quality standards (Step 2a). Under
the threat of losing the subsidy, therefore, a household may revise its decision
regarding whether to stay in its original apartment or move elsewhere.
This model illustrates two important concepts. First, it suggests that a
household's perception of the openness of the housing market plays an
important role in the household's search activity. Consider a household that
believes that landlords in desired areas would treat it unfavorably (i.e., refuse
to rent to any Section 8 households, or turn the family away for racially
discriminatory reasons). The household may decide against searching for better
housing in those areas because it would value SC, (expected search costs) high
and FRE (expected value of future residence) low. The household would
therefore tend either to stay in its original apartment, if possible, or to look for
housing only in neighborhoods perceived to be less closed.
Furthermore, the role of search costs in a family's moving decision helps
explain why enrollees often fail to move outside of their original neighbor-
hoods, particularly when given only a short time to conduct their housing
searches. Studies have demonstrated that many families lack informal networks
to help them find housing in neighborhoods outside their own, and many lack
the transportation and day care services necessary to facilitate successful
searches in other neighborhoods. 7 The minority poor also tend to face
126. "Residence" includes the characteristics of both the housing and the surrounding
neighborhood. Id. at 149.
127. Elizabeth A. Mulroy, The Search for Affordable Housing, in WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS:
CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE AND THE HOUSING MARKET
123, 145 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) (hereinafter Mulroy II).
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FIGURE 1: MOBILITY MODEL





Reevaluates decision to stay
Faced with the threat of losing
the subsidy after 60 to 120
days, the family reevaluates its
housing preferences. The
longer the family is unable to
qualify in place, the more
likely the family will try to find
an apartment elsewhere
(Step 2b) in order not to lose
the subsidy.
Step 3b
Reevaluates decision to move
Faced with the threat of losing
the subsidy after 60 to 120
days, the family reevaluates its
housing preferences. The
longer the family is unable to
find a better apartment
elsewhere, the more likely the
family will try to qualify in its
current apartment (Step 2a) in
order not to lose the subsidy.
Step I
Family decides whether it will try to stay or move
Upon enrolling in the Section 8 program, the family first decides whether it wants to stay in its
current apartment or instead prefers to try to find a superior residence. The family compares the
utility it would derive from using its subsidy in its current apartment to the maximum utility it
would derive from using the subsidy to relocate elsewhere. The family therefore compares:
VALuE OF EXISTING RESIDENCE (ER) versus
Mm urnI [EXPECTED VALUE OF AN ALTERNATIVE nTUnRE RESIDENCE (FR ) - EXPECTED SEARCH
COSTS TO FIND THAT RESIDENCE (SC) - EXPECTED COSTS OF MOVING TO THAT RESIDENCE (MCE)].




If the family's current apartment does not
meet federal housing quality and/or rent
standards, the family tries to persuade the
landlord to upgrade the apartment and/or
reduce the rent. While trying to use its
subsidy to remain in its current




The family tries to find an available
apartment where FRE - MCE > ER and
that meets federal housing quality and
rent standards. While unsuccessful at
locating such an apartment, the family
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higher "generalized relocation costs" " than do poor white households." 9
These search and relocation costs may generally deter minority families from
major residential moves.130
C. Promoting Landlord Participation
Widespread landlord nonparticipation in the program is perhaps the most
serious obstacle to residential choice facing Section 8 recipients. A recent
national study of landlords"' and empirical evidence from many cities
3
1
including Boston133 show that many landlords simply refuse to participate in
the Section 8 program. Landlord resistance significantly impedes residential
mobility, 34 in part because residents narrow their housing searches to
"Section 8 submarkets" where landlords have experience renting to Section 8
recipients. 35 As suggested by the mobility model, the limited search strate-
gies of many minority households with housing subsidies show that they
perceive that landlords in certain neighborhoods will simply refuse to rent to
them. 1
36
Several aspects of the regulatory structure reduce landlord participation.
First, a landlord may fear the limitations which Section 8 imposes on her usual
128. Generalized relocation costs include search, information and transactions costs, as well as the
social and psychic costs of leaving familiar surroundings. FRANK W. PORELL, MODELS OF INTRAURBAN
RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION 61 (1982).
129. Id. at 131 (presenting data from Wichita demonstrating that "the distance/generalized cost
barriers faced by nonwhite households are more pervasive" than barriers facing "low-income white
household counterparts").
130. Id. at 145 ("Most researchers would attribute the powerful distance deterrent effects found in
this study to a variety of factors, such as the limited spatial awareness of households, the costs of
information and search, moving costs, the psychic costs of breaking social ties, or to institutional
barriers such as housing market discrimination in the case of non-white households.").
131. MERYL FINKEL, ABT ASSOCIATES, FINAL REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS TO
MAKE THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE PRIVATE RENTAL MARKET 10-21 (1994).
132. Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 40-50 (Nov. 3, 1993) (testimony of David Bryson, National Housing Law
Project).
133. 79% of enrollees reported contact with landlords who simply refused to participate in Section
8. Mulroy I, supra note 127, at 134. One enrollee reported that certain landlords "told me plain and
simple they don't take Section 8; that's their policy." Id. at 136.
134. Departments of Veterans' Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations for 1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Veterans Affairs, Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., Part 6 at 131 (April 26, 1994) (statement of Michael A. Stegman, Asst. See. for Pol. Devel.
and Research, HUD) (stating that HUD research indicates that Section 8 does not promote much
mobility or landlord participation).
135. STEPHEN D. KENNEDY & MERYL FINKEL, SECTION 8 RENTAL VOUCHER AND RENTAL
CERTIFICATE UTILIZATION STUDY: FINAL REPORT iv, 72 (1994). These results are consistent with the
mobility model presented above. In formulating its search strategy, a family will factor in the expected
costs of its search and therefore might avoid searching in those neighborhoods where it believes that
landlords will refuse Section 8 subsidies.
136. Francis J. Cronin, Racial Differences in the Search for Housing, in MODELLNG HOUSING
MARKEr SEARCH 81, 85-103 (W.A.V. Clark ed., 1982).
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ability to get rid of a "problem tenant." Typically, when an unassisted market
lease expires, both the owner and tenant may decide whether or not to renew
the lease under new terms and rent. A landlord who has problems with an
unassisted tenant will avoid the difficulty and cost of an eviction process by
simply refusing to renew the lease at the end of the lease term. 37 In some
markets, owners reduce their risks further by setting short initial lease terms,
such as ninety days. 3 '
Under the Section 8 program, by contrast, a landlord faces stringent
barriers to removing a tenant. The initial lease term must be annual, with
provisions for automatic renewal after the initial term.13 9 The owner may
only terminate the tenancy upon the grounds specified by the regulations."
Moreover, during the initial lease term, the owner may not terminate the
tenancy for "other good cause" if the family is not at fault.' 4' After the initial
lease term, the owner may choose not to renew the lease, but only if she is
able to demonstrate "good cause" or other sufficient reason for eviction.
Judicial interpretations of the renewal requirement have been strict. For
example, one state court has held that, absent good cause for eviction, a
Section 8 tenant "may remain in the housing for life, and his right to do so is
a constitutionally protected property interest." 42 The year-long initial lease
term and eviction limitations may impose on the landlord significant impedi-
ments in weeding out disruptive tenants whose behavior does not quite rise to
the level of the "good cause" provision of the regulations. According to one
study, these substantive tenant protections have deterred landlords from
participating in the program. 43
Second, landlords may decline to accept Section 8 tenants because of the
137. FNKEL, supra note 131, at 11.
138. Id.
139. 24 C.F.R. § 982.309(b) (1996).
140. The listed reasons include: serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease; violation of federal state, or local law which imposes obligations on the tenant in connection with
the occupancy or use of the dwelling unit and surrounding premises; any criminal activity engaged in
by the tenant, family members or guests that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment
of the premises by other tenants or nearby residents; drug-related criminal activity on or near such
premises; and other good cause. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1995); 24 C.F.R. § 982.3 10(a),(c)
(1996). "Other good cause" includes: failure by the family to accept the offer of a new lease; a family
history of disturbance of property, or of living and housekeeping habits resulting in damage to the unit
or property; criminal activity by family members involving crimes of physical violence to persons or
property; the owner's desire to utilize the unit for non-residential use; and the owner's desire to
terminate the tenancy for business reasons, such as sale of the property and renovation of the unit. 24
C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1) (1996).
141. The owner may not terminate the tenancy for the following reasons: "failure by the family to
accept the offer of a new lease or revision; the owner's desire to use the unit for personal or family use,
or for a purpose other than as a residential rental unit or a business or economic reason for termination
of the tenancy." 24 C.F.R.§ 982.310(d)(2) (1996).
142. Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. Wooten, 597 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ohio App. 1992).
143. FINKEL, supra note 131, at 11-12; see also id. at 7-8 (describing focus group methodology
of the study).
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stringent federal procedural requirements involved in tenant evictions. 144 The
owner, for instance, must notify the PHA in writing of the commencement of
procedures for termination of the tenancy145 and must obtain the PHA's
authorization before carrying out an eviction. 1" The owner must also give
the tenant written notice specifying the grounds for eviction," with the
length of the notice determined by state law, 14 and the owner must provide
the tenant and PHA ninety days' notice when planning to terminate or refuse
to renew an assistance contract. 149 Section 8 tenants under threat of eviction
have standing to challenge deficiencies in the landlord's termination notices on
Due Process and civil rights grounds, 5 ' and they may be constitutionally
entitled to an oral hearing.' A landlord's failure to comply with these
procedures renders the eviction invalid."5 Like the substantive eviction
protections mentioned above, these procedural rules tend to discourage
landlords from participating in the Section 8 program.1
53
The final major obstacle to increased landlord participation is that landlords
generally can use Section 8 status as a pretext for discriminating against
families on the basis of race, gender, or number of children. Case law makes
clear that a potential tenant generally has no due process rights against a
landlord because the landlord is "free to accept applications only from those
persons he or she expects to be responsible tenants, and the Section 8 program
does not constrain the owners' judgment on that question." 54 A landlord,
therefore, can generally turn down an applicant simply on the basis of the
applicant's status as a Section 8 recipient. 55 One observer believes that racial
discrimination against minority families, rather than any shortage of rental
units, is the main reason that Section 8 holders have such difficulty finding
144. The landlord, not the PHA, is responsible for evictions. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e) (1996).
145. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(2) (1996). See, e.g., Lamlon Development Corp. v. Owens, 533
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (Dist. CL 1988) (barring summary eviction where landlord has not served copy of
termination notice on PHA at same time notice served on tenant).
146. See, e.g., Jennie Realty Co. v. Sandberg, 480 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iv) (1995); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(1) (1996).
148. See, e.g., Gallman v. Pierce, 639 F. Supp. 472, 477 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9) (1995).
150. See, e.g., Gallman, 639 F. Supp. at 482 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
151. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Authority, 503 F. Supp. 610, 620 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), aft'd, 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir., 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); c. Swam v.
Gastonia Housing Authority, 675 F.2d 1342, 1345 (4th Cir. 1982) (tenant must have opportunity to
respond but no full-fledged hearing required).
152. See, e.g., Vanderveer Assoc., No. 5 v. Lewis, 450 N.Y.S.2d 709,711 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
153. FINKEL, supra note 131, at4.
154. Germain v. Recht-Golding-Siegel Properties, 745 F.2d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1987) (reversing grant of
summary judgment against large landlord who systematically refused to rent to Section 8 holders for
allegedly legitimate business reasons). But see Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoining landlord from denying admission to Section 8 holders
based on factors that had disparate impact on minorities),finaljudgment sub nom. Glover v. Crestwood
Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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available rental units. 5 6
Paradoxically, current law also discourages a landlord from trying out the
Section 8 program. Once an owner accepts one Section 8 resident in any of her
properties, the owner may not refuse to lease a unit renting at or below the
FMR to any other certificate or voucher holder if the proximate cause of the
refusal "is the status of such prospective tenant as a holder" of Section 8
benefits. 11 While this provision was intended to enhance residential choice,
it probably discourages landlords from experimenting with the Section 8
program and further limits the acceptability of Section 8 in general.'
Two reforms, adopted in conjunction, would remedy these problems of
landlord participation. The first proposed reform would require owners to treat
Section 8 tenants in the same way that they treat other tenants. Under this
proposal, owners would have the right to limit the initial lease term, to decide
whether or not to renew a lease, and to undertake evictions in accordance with
state and local rules. Section 8 residents, however, could lodge a counterclaim
against landlords who apply different lease or eviction standards to them as
compared to other tenants. At the same time, Section 8 residents would retain
the protections provided to all renters in the local jurisdiction, including, where
allowed, the right to escrow rent for failure of the owner to provide quality
housing as promised. Because the PHAs often pay most of the rent burden of
Section 8 recipients, regulations would have to mandate that PHAs cooperate
with Section 8 tenants who withhold rent for good cause. 159
This policy would generate significant benefits. It would promote residential
choice and mobility because it would cause more landlords to participate in the
program. It would protect the rights of Section 8 tenants by ensuring that
landlords not impose different lease conditions on them than on other tenants
in the property."6° Finally, the proposal would promote horizontal equity.
Current Section 8 eviction protections exacerbate the horizontal inequities
already existing between recipients of household-based Section 8 recipients and
156. Anthony Downs, A Strategy for Designing a Fully Comprehensive National Housing Policy
for the Federal Government of the United States, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS 61, 86 (Denise DiPasquale
& Langley C. Keyes eds., 1990).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1) (1995). A multifamily housing project is a residential building
containing more than 4 dwelling units. Id.
158. FiNKEL, supra note 131, at 10.
159. Id. at 25 n.18.
160. An important criticism of this proposal is that Section 8 tenants generally lack the legal
resources to challenge landlords who might violate this equal treatment protection, particularly in light
of current cutbacks in the resources and capabilities of legal services organizations that receive federal
funding. See Bill Maxwell, The Unfair Rationing of Justice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at
ID (describing proposed congressional prohibitions on class action suits in landlord-tenant matters, and
quoting one legal services lawyer stating that "the only thing less popular than a poor person these days
is a poor person with a lawyer"). Perhaps one solution would be to establish a federal fair housing claim
for tenants whose landlords treat them differently than other tenants with regards to leases or evictions.
Because such an anti-discrimination provision would provide significant financial penalties and a federal
cause of action, aggrieved Section 8 tenants would be better able to protect their rights.
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the millions of very low income families who do not receive housing subsidies.
Non-recipients currently receive neither federal resources nor federal eviction
protections. Under this reform, however, Section 8 tenants and other tenants
would all be treated equally.
In addition, Congress should enact a federal source-of-income nondiscrimi-
nation law barring landlords from turning away Section 8 applicants because
of their status as Section 8 holders or because of the requirements that the
Section 8 program may impose on landlords.161 This nondiscrimination
requirement would be similar to existing regulations imposed on landlords who
have participated in certain federal housing programs.162
Federal nondiscrimination provisions are necessary because state fair
housing protections are insufficient. Only a few states bar landlords from
refusing to rent to a family because the family receives housing subsidies or
other public assistance. 63 Although these state statutes survive federal
preemption challenges,"6 they probably do not significantly deter landlords
because state enforcement of fair housing laws is generally inadequate.s
Moreover, all of the existing state laws except the Massachusetts statute
may allow landlords to refuse a tenant on the grounds that the Section 8
requirements are unduly onerous. The former Massachusetts law, which is
161. See, e.g., Bryson, supra note 132, at 25 (advocating Section 8 nondiscrimination law).
162. For example, landlords who acquire projects from HUD under its multi-family property
disposition program cannot refuse tenants solely because of their status as certificate or voucher holders.
12 U.S.C. § 1701z-12 (1995).
163. As of May 1995, only nine states and the District of Columbia had such laws. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-54c(a) (West 1995) (banning discrimination in housing rental and sales based on
lawful source of income). § 46a-63(3) (West 1995) (defining lawful source of income to include housing
assistance); D.C. STAT. ANN. § 1-2515(a) (1994) (banning discrimination in real property transactions
based on source of income); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83b, § 9-109(3) (Michie 1994) (banning owner
interference with efforts of tenants to obtain housing subsidies and banning discrimination in housing
rentals on basis of source of income or receipt of housing subsidies); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
151B, § 4(7) (West 1995) (banning advertisements of housing rentals and sales which indicate preference
or limitation based on public assistance recipiency), § 4(10) (West 1995) (banning discrimination against
recipients of public assistance or housing subsidies in housing rentals, either because the individuals are
recipients or because of any requirements of the public assistance or housing subsidy programs); ME.
REv. SrAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4582 (West 1995) (banning discrimination in housing rentals against recipients
of public assistance, including housing subsidies, primarily because of individuals' recipient status);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (West 1995) (banning discrimination in housing rentals and sales based
on status with regard to public assistance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.4-02(3) and 4.12(2) (Michie
1993) (banning discrimination in real property transactions based on status with regard to public
assistance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 (Michie 1994) (banning discrimination in housing rentals and
sales based on source of income); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (1993) (banning discrimination in
housing rentals and sales based on person's status as recipient of public assistance); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 101.22(1)(Im)(nm), (1)(2) (West 1995) (banning discrimination in housing rentals and sales based on
lawful source of income).
164. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Mass. 1987) (stating that
nothing in federal statutes conflicts with Massachusetts' anti-discrimination provision).
165. James A. Kushner, The FairHousingAmendmentsAct of 1988: The Second Generation ofFair
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1098 (1989) ("[Most states have had little experience investigating,
processing, and resolving fair housing disputes, and some cities are not even aware that their city
council once passed fair housing legislation.").
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similar to the other existing state laws, prohibited discrimination against a
tenant receiving rental assistance "solely because the individual is such a
recipient." 1" In Attorney General v. Brown, 67 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against a large landlord
who systematically refused to rent to Section 8 holders. The landlord claimed
that he was not discriminating against Section 8 applicants on the grounds that
they were recipients of such assistance168 He asserted that instead he had
legitimate business reasons for refusing to accept Section 8 applicants,
including the disadvantages of the Section 8 lease form and the program's
limitations on required rent advances and security deposits.169 The court held
that these business reasons, if true, would legitimize the landlord's practices.
As a result of this decision, the Massachusetts legislature subsequently added
to the law a provision prohibiting discrimination "because of any requirement
of such public assistance, rental assistance, or housing subsidy program. "170
An appropriate federal nondiscrimination provision, therefore, must bar two
types of discrimination: discrimination based simply on the applicant's status
as a Section 8 holder and discrimination based on the requirements of the
Section 8 program."' Such a provision might be expected to reduce discrimi-
nation against Section 8 recipients. Local fair housing centers could easily
conduct fair housing audits to test the effect of "Section 8 status," just as they
currently test for discrimination based on race, gender and presence of
children. 1" They could then bring suit against landlords under federal fair
housing law which, unlike state law, imposes significant penalties."'
Certainly some landlords who do not wish to accept Section 8 recipients might
attempt to circumvent the provision by developing stringent requirements for
applicants, including cosigner requirements, credit checks, and rent history
checks,174 all of which Section 8 holders might tend to fail more than non-
Section 8 tenants applying for the same units. Nonetheless, a nondiscrimination
requirement would at least discourage the egregious bans on Section 8
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(10) (1985), cited in Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105.
167. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105.
168. Id. at 1108.
169. Id. at 1108-09.
170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(10) (West 1995). As currently written, this law has
imposed penalties on landlords who flatly refuse Section 8 tenants. See Mills v. More et al., No. 87-
BPR-0419 (1995), and Harrison v. Horowitz, No. 92-BPR-0230 (1995) (reported in Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly).
171. Preventing the latter type of discrimination might not be necessary if the Section 8 program
were substantially deregulated, with inspections and special lease terms abandoned.
172. See Veronica M. Reed, Fair Housing Enforcement: Is the Current System Adequate?, in
RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERiCAN LEGACY 222, 226 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) ("To
date, use of fair housing tests alone or to substantiate the claim of a bona fide applicant remains the
single most effective method of identifying, substantiating, and prosecuting noncompliance with fair
housing laws.").
173. See Kushner, supra note 165, at 1088-98 (describing federal fair housing provisions).
174. Id. at 1060 (stating ways in which rental agents may mask discriminatory practices).
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applicants practiced by many landlords.
D. Encouraging Local Mobility
Even if these reforms were adopted, however, some Section 8 enrollees
may be unable to locate satisfactory apartments. This Section of the Note
proposes essential reforms that would lower the housing search costs of Section
8 recipients, thereby reducing the enrollee failure rate and helping families to
locate better housing opportunities in more widely dispersed areas. First, the
federal government should impose PHA performance standards for housing
counseling and landlord recruitment, including standards that require PHAs to
identify appropriate housing opportunities outside of areas of concentrated
poverty. Such a policy would encourage PHAs to stop their current practices
of steering minorities inadvertently "to certain neighborhoods by passively
providing rental listings that include primarily landlords who have notified the
PHA of apartment openings.""175
Effective housing counseling would both expand the geographic search of
Section 8 enrollees and reduce failure rates. For example, EHAP studies
revealed that minority movers receiving housing counseling services in tight
markets succeeded in qualifying for the program 65 % of the time, while only
26% of minority movers with no services succeeded. 76 Similarly, the Boston
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) conducted a multi-year housing
counseling effort involving active recruitment of landlords through mailings and
contacts with local realtor groups."TI DPW also authorized housing search
workers to advance "holding" fees of one-half month's rent to property owners
to cover the period between the landlord's agreement to rent to a homeless
family and the local PHA's housing inspection and subsidy authorization. 7'
As a result, the failure rate of homeless families with children was 5% or less
throughout the very tight rental market of 1985 to 1990.179 By contrast, the
Voucher Demonstration Study conducted in the mid-1980s found a failure rate
of more than 53% among all enrollees in the Section 8 household-based
subsidy program run by the Boston Housing Authority. 'I
Outreach and counseling alone are important but not comprehensive
175. PHILIP D. TEGELER Er AL., Transforming Section 8: Using Federal Housing Subsidies to
Promote Individual Housing Choice and Desegregation, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 482-83
(1995).
176. James P. Zais, Administering Housing Allowances, in HOUSING VOUcHERS FOR THE POOR:
LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 235, 257 (Raymond J. Stniyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds.,
1981).
177. Barbara Sard, The Massachusetts Experience with Targeted Tenant-Based Rental Assistance
for the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy for Socially Disfavored Groups, Part 1, 1 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 16, 22 (1993) [hereinafter Sard I].
178. Id. at 22 & n.72.
179. Id. at 18.
180. LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 65.
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elements of a complete assisted move strategy. The empirical data set forth
above suggest that search costs severely constrain the housing choices of poor
and minority families. The government should therefore consider providing
resources to families to lower their expected search costs through targeted
assistance for transportation and day care during the search.
Another important policy to promote residential choice would be to relax
the time requirements for Section 8 enrollees' housing searches to 180 days.
Under HUD's current regulations, Section 8 enrollees have as little as 60 days
to find a willing landlord.' These rules significantly narrow the housing
opportunities of those who face serious transportation constraints or discrimina-
tory barriers in the housing market. In some cases, these households end up
returning their certificates or vouchers to the PHA. In other cases, time
pressures may force them to choose housing units and/or neighborhoods of
poor quality"n or to lease in place when they would prefer to move."
Extending the search time would significantly help those least able to find
housing quickly.
E. Encouraging Regional Mobility
The reforms described above, while important, do not address the special
obstacles facing families in central cities who wish to move to suburban areas
under the jurisdiction of another PHA.'14 A household that receives a Section
8 demand-side subsidy from an urban PHA often faces serious difficulties in
locating housing opportunities in suburban areas. Although the household is
allowed to use the subsidy in a "portable" manner by moving to another
jurisdiction," = the urban PHA loses significant administrative fees for
transferred subsidies.' 86 "Because of this potential loss of administrative fees,
the current Section 8 portability system tends to threaten the PHA's vested
interests and create an incentive to discourage participating families from
181. The regulations do allow the PHA to extend the search time to a maximum of 120 days, but
they leave the PHA with absolute discretion not to do so. See supra note 53.
182. Bryson, supra note 132, at 46.
183. Mulroy I, supra note 111, at 543 (describing plight of certain families in study who could not
"break through landlord barriers to relocate to better-quality housing or better locations" and therefore
.scrambled at the last minute to lease the units they presently lived in and wanted to vacate to at least
take advantage of much-needed lower rent").
184. For purposes of brevity, this section presents a description of a typical central city PHA with
multiple suburban PHAs. For a description of some other jurisdictional structures, see TEGELER Er AL.,
supra note 175, at 464-67.
185. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r) (1995); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.351-982.355
(describing portability provisions). For a description for one minor limitation on portability, see 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(1) (1995) (stating that if family applies as non-resident to PHA, it must then remain
within the jurisdiction of that PHA for year).
186. 24 C.F.R. § 982.355(e)(2) (1996) (stating that issuing PHAs must forfeit 80% of ongoing
administrative fee when another jurisdiction takes over administration of contract). Administrative fees
are extremely lucrative for large urban PHAs, who derive a surplus of over 16% from them. HUD:
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES, supra note 79, at 21.
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moving out of the jurisdiction."" s
The urban resident typically faces similar resistance from suburban PHAs,
many of whom want to exclude low-income minorities from neighboring cities.
Suburban PHAs often employ local residency preferences'"8 and various
informal and illegal means"89 to avoid issuing subsidies to non-residents."9
In light of these practices, a suburban PHA is also unlikely to be eager to assist
a low-income minority household receiving Section 8 from an urban PHA who
wants to find housing in the suburban PHA's jurisdiction. The administrative
system thus strongly discourages many urban families from finding housing in
suburban areas. Moreover, urban PHAs are under no obligation to provide
Section 8 enrollees with any information about suburban housing opportunities.
These limitations on interjurisdictional mobility result from the strong spirit
of localism inherent in the 1937 Housing Act, which is supply-side in origin
but provides the administrative structure for demand-side Section 8 policies.
This legislation empowered local housing authorities (later named Public
Housing Agencies) to control the construction and operation of public housing
projects."' PHAs usually formed at the "smallest possible political subdivi-
sion," '1 as part of the express federal policy of providing localities maxi-
mum control of housing policy." Local control may have been a necessary
element of a national supply-side housing policy because construction and siting
decisions are, arguably, best performed by local authorities. However, by
grafting demand-side Section 8 policy onto this system of local control,
Congress impeded the very goal of regional mobility that it hoped demand-side
Section 8 would advance. The self-interest of urban and suburban PHAs have
combined to significantly limit residential choice for urban Section 8 residents.
Several different types of solutions could remedy this problem of limited
interjurisdictional mobility. Abolishing the local Section 8 delivery system in
187. This disincentive occurs despite certain legislative efforts to encourage urban PHAs to promote
mobility to the suburbs. TEGELER Er AL., supra note 175, at 479-80. For example, PHAs must inform
subsidy recipients that they can move to other jurisdictions, and PHAs must advise families living in
high poverty Census tracts of the advantages of moving to areas with lower concentrations of poor
families. 24 C.F.R. § 982.301(a)(2)-(3) (1996). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(q)(1) (1995) permits
HUD to compensate PHAs for any loss of certificates.
188. 24 C.F.R. § 982.208 (1996); see TEGELER ET AL., supra note 175, at 472 n.93 (citing internal
HUD study conducted in 1994 showing that 46% of 2541 reporting PHAs had local residency
preferences for household-based Section 8 programs).
189. Sard II, supra note 45, at 192-94.
190. See, e.g., TEGELER ET AL., supra note 175, at 472 (stating that residency preferences in
suburban Buffalo PHA caused black city residents to wait "over ten years for subsidies they would never
receive," while "white suburban applicants received subsidies within eighteen to twenty-four months").
191. Local governments influence the development of public housing through appoinments to the
local authority and through veto power over the size, location, design and staffing of housing
developments. Eugene 3. Meehan, The Evolution of Public Housing Policy, in FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY AND PROGRAMS 287, 291 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985).
192. Tegeler, supra note 3, at 218.
193. "It is the policy of the United States... to vest in local public housing agencies the maximum
amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs." 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1995).
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favor of a state-run system would be the most radical and perhaps the most
effective policy. 94 Residents would apply to a state-run waiting list, and
states would contract with regional governmental or non-profit agencies that
would certify income eligibility, provide housing counseling, and conduct
landlord outreach throughout metropolitan areas. 195 The federal government
could also establish performance-based incentives encouraging states to achieve
low failure rates and high movement of recipient households away from
neighborhoods of extreme poverty. Under this proposal, local PHAs would be
stripped of their role in operating demand-side housing programs, but would
still operate supply-side housing programs.
Regional housing mobility programs also represent a promising, though
more limited, method of promoting residential choice among subsidy recipients.
A federal regional housing mandate could require local PHAs to fund regional
organizations that would operate housing mobility programs, such as housing
counseling and landlord outreach, while the PHAs would still operate waiting
lists and certify Section 8 eligibility. In certain cases, courts have required
regional housing counseling and landlord outreach programs that have proven
quite successful. For example, the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program in
Chicago, operated by the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communi-
ties, provides a comprehensive counseling, placement and support program to
help black"9 Section 8 holders locate apartments in metropolitan Chicago
neighborhoods with minority populations of less than thirty percent."9 Soon,
the program will have placed over 7000 households, 98 more than half of
them in the Chicago suburbs.'" The Leadership Council operates a highly
contested phone-in registration one day a year, registering 2000 families out
of more than 10,000 estimated callers.'m Participants have one hundred
194. See TEGELER Er AL., supra note 175, at 475 (mentioning briefly strategy of "creating a
centralized regional or statewide Section 8 administrator").
195. This proposal would represent a radical extension of current policy, which does allow some
flexibility in the operation of Section 8 demand-side subsidies. PHAs eligible to operate Section 8
programs may include "Ealny state, county, municipality or other governmental entity or public body
(or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is authorized to engage in or assist in the development or
operation of housing for low-income families." 24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (1996); see Tegeler, supra note 3,
at 231.
196. Eligibility for the program is limited to black current or former public housing residents or
applicants. Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Opportunities,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 335, 340 (Special Issue, 1993).
197. Id. at 340.
198. From 1976 to 1981, the program operated as a demonstration program, at which point the
court approved a consent decree establishing the Gautreaux program as a primary method of relief to
continue until 7100 members of the plaintiff class had been given relief. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523
F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (N.D. IM. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1982); Davis, supra note 44, at 2; see also Flynn McRoberts, Gautreaux Housing Program Nears End,
Cm. TRm., Jan. 12, 1996, at I (stating that program will end by second half of 1996).
199. TEGELER ET AL., supra note 175, at 459 n.27.
200. Davis, supra note 44, at 3.
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eighty days from the time they attend a briefing to find housing." A housing
counselor discusses with the household members the application process,
reviews their credit, rental, personal and family history, and assists them in
submitting information to the landlord. The counselor is then available to assist
the family for ninety days after the move-in date with any questions or con-
cerns.? The program has generated significant employment and educational
benefits from suburban moves" at a cost of only about $1000 extra per
household.'
Despite the success of housing mobility programs in Chicago and
elsewhere,' the federal government has not adequately incorporated such
features into its Section 8 program. In 1992, Congress did adopt a national
pilot project known as the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing demonstra-
tion program.' In the face of opposition from suburban residents in
Baltimore and elsewhere, however, a Senate and House joint conference
committee later killed a $149.1 million provision that would have financed the
program's expansion.?
Even if the federal government does not regionalize the operation of
housing counseling and landlord outreach, it still should act more forcefully to
encourage urban and suburban PHAs to promote interjurisdictional residential
choice. For example, the government could provide fee incentives to encourage
"receiving PHAs" in higher income areas to compete among each other for
outside residents. 8 Similarly, a revised administrative fee structure could
encourage central city PHAs to place residents in other jurisdictions, especially
in neighborhoods of low poverty concentration. Finally, the government could
require all PHAs to be more aggressive in identifying potential landlords in less
distressed neighborhoods,2 9 and could mandate the sharing of landlord
information among PHAs within a metropolitan region. The Section 8 program
will only be effective if PHAs begin to view interjurisdictional moves,
especially moves from high to low poverty areas, to be in their best interest.
A few urban PHAs already have implemented sound housing mobility
programs. For example, the Hartford PHA has contracted with a non-profit
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 20.
204. Roisman & Botein, supra note 196, at 340.
205. Other mobility programs currently operate in a handful of metropolitan areas, including
Cincinnati, Dallas, Memphis, and Milwaukee. Roisman & Botein, supra note 196, at 340-44.
206. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550 § 152, 106 Stat.
3672, 3716 (1992); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f note (1995).
207. See Ann Mariano, Hill Panel Halts Plan to Move Poor Families: U.S. Relocation Subsidies
Spurred Complaints, WASH. POSr, Sept. 3, 1994, at El. This expanded program, known as "Choice
in Residency," would have provided housing mobility counseling for up to 300,000 additional families.
HUD FY 1995 BUDGET: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17 (1994), cited in Tegeler, supra note 3, at 232 n.83.
208. Tegeler, supra note 3, at 232.
209. See, e.g., TEGELER Er AL., supra note 175, at 482-83.
Yale Law & Policy Review
organization that initiates outreach to suburban realtors, regularly collects and
posts suburban rental listings, disseminates information about suburban
transportation and services, and coordinates with volunteers in suburban towns
willing to take Section 8 recipients on tours of their neighborhoods.21° By
April 1993, nearly three hundred families had permanently moved to suburban
jurisdictions. More than ninety percent of participants were people of color
who moved from impoverished urban areas to much more prosperous suburban
neighborhoods.
21'
VI. HARNESSING THE POWER OF CHOICE WITH THE RENTAL PAYMENT
STRUCTURE
As described in Part HI, the certificate and voucher programs adopt
somewhat different formulae for calculating the share of the rent paid by the
household and the PHA at different rent levels. Unfortunately, neither payment
structure adequately promotes important policy objectives of housing quality
and cost-effectiveness because neither scheme fully motivates households to
search for and negotiate better housing bargains. This Part proposes program
consolidation under an improved payment structure.212
In the certificate program, the household must find a unit renting at or
below the Fair Market Rent (FMR).213 PHAs pays to the landlord the
difference between the contract rent and 30% of the household's monthly
adjusted gross income. In the voucher program, the PHA sets a payment
standard roughly equivalent to the FMR, but the household can choose a unit
renting at any price. The PHA then pays the owner the difference between the
payment standard and 30% of the family's monthly adjusted income. The PHA
payment to the owner, however, may not exceed the amount by which the
actual rent to the owner exceeds 10% of the family's monthly gross income.
Administrators hoped that the voucher program would encourage
households to shop for apartments with lower rents by allowing households to
capture the full benefit of the rent reduction. If a unit rents for less than the
payment standard, the family benefits by paying less than 30% of its monthly
adjusted income for rent, subject to the minimum rent computation. On the
210. SHAUN DONOVAN, MOVING TO THE SUBURBS: SECION 8 MOBILTY AND PORTABILITY IN
HARTFORD 7-8 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, Working Paper W94-3, 1994);
Roisman & Botein, supra note 196, at 339-44.
211. DONOVAN, supra note 210, at 29 (showing that 91.5% of families were black or Hispanic);
id. at 19 ("The average Hartford Section 8 certificate-holder living within the city resides in a census
tract with a poverty rate of 28.7%, over four times greater than the poverty rate of 7% for a census tract
where the average mobility participant lives.").
212. Consolidating both programs into a single policy would increase administrative efficiency
because each currently requires separate budgeting and accounting. HUD: ADMINISTRATIVE FEES, supra
note 79, at 32-33.
213. Assume that utilities are included in the contract rent that the household negotiates with the
landlord.
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other hand, if a unit rents for more than the payment standard, the family is
free to rent the unit, but it must pay the entire difference between the rent and
the PHA's payment.
For detailed examples of these two payment structures, see Figures 2, 3
and 4. In both cases, the FMR is $800, the household's gross monthly income
is $1200, and its adjusted monthly income is $1000. This hypothetical
household has a gross monthly income of $1200 and an adjusted monthly
income of $1000, and it must find an apartment with a rent below the FMR of
$800. No matter how much the apartment rents for, the household will always
have to pay $300. Depending on the amount that the landlord charges, the
PHA payment could range from $0 to $500 (the difference between the FMR
and the household payment).
In the voucher example, the household will receive assistance if it rents any
apartment priced above $120 (10% of its monthly gross income). As rents
increase from $120 to the voucher payment "comer" of $620 (10% of monthly
gross income plus the difference between the FMR and 30% of adjusted
monthly income), the PHA payment increases from $0 to $500 (the FMR
minus 30% of adjusted monthly income) while the household payment remains
constant at $120. Above rents of $620, the PHA payment remains constant at
$500 while the household payment increases to cover the difference.
The pricing structure of the certificate program violates several objectives
of low-income rental housing policy. First, it is not a cost-effective means of
assuring quality affordable housing. Because household payments are constant
over the range of rents, recipients pay no additional out-of-pocket costs for
higher rent units. They therefore have no incentive to economize on rent or
negotiate with landlords. Instead, "it is in their interest to gain the greatest
value of additional subsidy beyond their contribution. As a consequence,
landlords of units somewhat below FMR submarket quality have an incentive
to raise rents to FMR, even if they do not upgrade."214 By contrast, voucher
recipients do have an incentive to economize in negotiating rents for all rent
levels above the voucher payment "corner" ($620). A large national study
confirms that certificate recipients pay significantly more than voucher
recipients for housing at comparable quality levels.21
214. See ROTHENBERG Er AL., supra note 42, at 302 (concluding that, because of lack of
bargaining incentives, "some participants are induced to consume more housing than is optimal [given
their preferences] and that rents for dwellings near and at such quality levels are unnecessarily inflated
[at least in the short run]") (brackets in original).
215. LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 111. Only at rent levels near the FMR do certificate
holders have an incentive to economize, because exceeding the FMR generally causes them to fal to
qualify for the program. Id.; see also HOWENsrINE, supra note 107, at 123 (presenting data showing
that rent increases are considerably higher in certificate program than had occurred in EHAP program,
where recipients had monetary incentive to search and bargain for lowest possible rent).
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FIGURE 2: PAYMENT STRUCrURES OF CERTIFICATE, VOUCHER AND
PROPOSED PROGRAMS
The following examples assume a household with a gross monthly income of
$1200 and an adjusted monthly income of $1000. The household lives in an
area where the FMR is $800 for the relevant apartment size.
S Total renta paymets e month
6001 6201 7001 8WI 9001001 1101 12001U201 301 401 50
CERTIWCATE PROGRAM
Gvmvementpayment per month * 0 100 200 300 320 400 500 4 * * *
Honsholdpaymentpermouth S300 300 300 300 300 300 300 * * * *
Household disposable income per month * 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 * *
VOUCHER PROGRAM
Gm m ent payment per month 0 180 280 380 480 500 500 500 500 SOO 500 50(
Household payment per mouth 120 120 120 120 120 120 200 300 400 500 600 70(
Household disposable income per month 880 8 880 880 880 880 800 700 600 500 400 301
PROPOSED PROGRAM
Government payment per month 0 132 206 279 353 368 427 500 500 500 500 5(
Household payment permonth 120 168 194 221 247 252 273 300 400 500 600 70
Householddisposableincomepermonth 880 832 806 779 753 748 727 700 600 500 400 301
1
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FIGURE 3: CERTIFICATE PAYMENT STRUCTURE
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A related incentive problem with the certificate program occurs during the
succeeding years of a household's eligibility. Once a household qualifies in a
dwelling, it has no reason to negotiate annual rent increases with the landlords;
as long as the landlord will accept HUD-established adjustments, the certificate
holder's situation is unchanged.
Moreover, the certificate program generally prevents households from
spending more than 30% of their adjusted monthly income on housing. This
provision runs counter to the principle of residential choice. For households
that place a special premium on the quality of housing or neighborhood
location in relationship to their other consumption possibilities, this limitation
is particularly onerous.
Like many other problems with household-based Section 8, the poor design
of the certificate program's payment structure is a legacy of supply-side
housing programs. Since its inception, the certificate program has carried with
it the same simple rent formula of public housing, in which households pay a
fraction of their adjusted monthly income (now thirty percent) and the
government makes up the difference. While this formula may make sense in
the context of public housing, where tenants are unable to search for better
housing bargains, it does not operate well in the private market because it
provides no incentives for households to shop or bargain for quality affordable
housing.
In different ways, the voucher program also fails to provide sufficient
incentives for households to improve the quality of their housing. Consider a
family living in an apartment that already qualifies under the housing quality
standards and that rents an apartment priced below the FMR. For several
reasons, the voucher program creates enormous incentives for that family to
lease in place rather than attempt to find better or more economical housing.
First, for all rents higher than the voucher payment "comer" ($620 in this
example), the PHA payments remain constant at $500. A household currently
renting an apartment at or above the "comer" amount has little incentive to
move to better housing, because it would have to pay the full amount of any
quality increases entirely out of its own pocket.
Second, households currently paying less than the voucher payment
"comer" in rent can save an inordinate amount of rent (the difference between
the current rent and 10% of monthly gross income) by simply using Section 8
subsidies to lease their current apartments. A household currently paying $600
a month, for example, would receive a full $480 a month from the PHA to
remain in the same apartment. In light of these savings and the costs of a
housing search, moving is hardly worthwhile. This lease-in-place effect is
especially pronounced in rent-controlled areas. In New York City, for example,
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an estimated 85% of voucher recipients remain in their same apartments.2 16
Many of these households did not achieve an increase in housing or neighbor-
hood quality but rather transformed the housing subsidy into a pure income
transfer.
The final problem with the voucher program is that at rents below the
voucher payment "comer," households living in low-cost apartments or
searching in low-cost housing markets have little incentive to economize.
Because household payments are constant at rents below the payment "comer,"
recipients who had been living in this range pay no additional out-of-pocket
costs for higher-rent units. They therefore are not encouraged to bargain hard
with their existing landlords to keep the rents low.
The proposed payment structure shown in Figure 5 largely remedies the
problems caused by the payment structures of the certificate and voucher
programs.217 Under the proposed structure, a household can only rent units
that cost at least 10% of the household's monthly gross income ($120). At that
level, all of the rent payments must be made by the household. As the rent
increases from that level to the FMR, the PHAs payments increase from $0 to
the difference between the FMR and 30% of adjusted monthly income (to $800
minus $300, or $500), while the household payments increase from 10% of
monthly gross income ($120) to 30% of adjusted monthly income ($300). At
rents above the FMR, PHA payments remain constant, as in the voucher
program.
This proposal would have several advantages over the current certificate
and voucher programs. Perhaps most important, it would restore the shopping
incentive entirely absent from the certificate program and absent from the
voucher program at rents up to the voucher payment "comer." By mandating
that households always pay out of pocket in order to obtain higher levels of
government subsidies, the proposal would hold down rents by encouraging
households to search and bargain for good housing values.2"' Also, unlike the
216. Section 8 HousingAssistance Payments Program, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 17 (1993) (statement of Paul T. Graziano, Deputy General Manager for Operations, New York
City Housing Authority, on behalf of the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities).
217. For a description of a similar payment structure, see ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 42, at
302-04. See also HOWENSTINE, supra note 107, at 71-99 (describing payment structures in a variety of
countries).
218. See ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 42, at 303 (stating this type of payment structure would
cause recipients to "have a vested interest in obtaining less expensive lodgings, thus tempering
landlords' inflationary incentives"). Although this proposal seems more complicated than the certificate
or voucher payment structures, PHAs could easily provide each Section 8 enrollee with a computerized
printout showing household and landlord payments at different rent levels, similar to the schedule shown
in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 5: PROPOSED PAYMENT STRUCTURE
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current certificate program, the proposed payment structure would allow
recipient families to pay more than 30% of their adjusted income if they wish,
thus enabling certain families to place a premium on housing and neighborhood
quality.
219
Moreover, this proposal would minimize households' incentives to lease in
place. First, unlike the voucher program, the proposed payment structure
would not hold PHA payments constant for all rent levels up to the FMR.
Because the PHA would help pay for increases in housing quality, households
currently renting inexpensive units would have a significant incentive to shop
for better housing. Second, households under this program would not benefit
as much from remaining in place as they would in the voucher program. As
shown in Figures 4 and 5, the PHA payment in the proposed program would
be less than the PHA payment in the voucher program for all rent levels below
the FMR. Finally, the mobility provisions suggested in Part V would reduce
incentives to lease in place by enabling households to engage in a wider search
for housing that better satisfies their needs. The revised payment structure,
combined with the mobility reforms, would motivate Section 8 recipients to
shop and bargain for quality housing in locations of their choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Why Not Cash?
In certain ways, many of the proposals in Parts IV and V would radically
simplify the Section 8 program. Indeed, eliminating inspections and certain
lease requirements could be viewed as the first step toward removing the
federal government from the messy details of housing policy altogether.
Ultimately, the federal government could provide assistance solely through
crude means such as refundable shelter tax creditsz or direct cash transfers.
A restructured Section 8 program, however, would generate important
benefits that an income transfer program would not. Because PHAs make
payments directly to landlords under the proposed policy, the public cannot
easily claim that recipient families are spending the benefits on non-housing
goods, although some substitution certainly occurs. The program therefore
maintains a certain amount of legitimacy even in times of fiscal tightening.
Furthermore, unlike an income transfer program, the proposed subsidy
program involves PHAs in monitoring the lease arrangements, thus assuring
219. For a description of one potential adverse consequence of an unlimited rent provision, see
LEGER & KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 21-24 (citing evidence from voucher program that 11% of
households with unconstrained rent limits overestimate their ability to pay large rents and therefore fail
out of program).
220. Elizabeth A. Roistacher, A Modest Proposal: Housing Vouchers as Refidable Tax Credits,
in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 162, 162-70 (Peter D. Salins ed., 1987).
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that reported tenant rent payments correspond to actual payments. This
oversight is necessary not only to save costs but also to ensure the effectiveness
of the shopping and bargaining incentives built into the proposed payment
structure.
A comprehensive demand-side housing policy also generates unique and
important positive externalities. 1 For example, the system of program
enrollment encourages responsible tenancies. Households are deterred from
engaging in egregious conduct because they face potential eviction and the
threatened loss of federal rental assistance.m Also, the program arguably
creates beneficial side-effects from residential integration of different race and
socioeconomic classes.
B. The Republican Proposals
Current Republican housing legislation in the House and Senate
envisions dramatic changes to many federal housing programs, including the
household-based Section 8 program. The Senate passed its housing reform bill
on January 10, 1996,11 while the House version was reported to the full
House on February 1, 19 96 .1 Although the two bills differ in several
respects, careful examination reveals that both would exacerbate many of the
Section 8 program's existing defects.
For example, the Republican proposals would increase current inequities
in the Section 8 program. As described in Part IV, Congress should reduce the
current income eligibility limit, which currently is 50% of area median
income.3 The current legislation, however, would increase the limit by
allowing PHAs to provide assistance to families with incomes at or below 80%
of area median income.2 7 As one expert notes, "about 60 percent of all
221. In general, a policy to increase the total amount that individuals spend on housing has
ambiguous effects on overall social utility. On the one hand, microeconomic theory suggests that
generous housing subsidy programs are less effective than equal cash payments in improving individual
utility. See MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MACROECONOMICS 72-74 (1994) (explaining that
in-kind transfer program is inefficient if it provides individual with more of a good than she would have
purchased absent program). On the other hand, the positive external or social benefits of housing would
justify a program that causes people to increase total expenditures on housing. See JAMES HEILBRUN,
URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 324 (1987) (describing certain marginal social benefits caused
by increased resources spent on housing provision).
222. See 24 C.F.R. §982.552(b) (1996) (stating that PHAs can terminate assistance to households
for various reasons, including illegal subletting and violent criminal activity). PHAs must provide Due
Process protections for tenants facing possible termination of assistance. 24 C.F.R. §982.554 (1996).
223. H.R. 2406, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Version 2, 1996) [hereinafter House Bill]; S. 1260, 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996) [hereinafter Senate Bill].
224. 142 Cong. Rec. S. 167 (Jan. 10, 1996).
225. 142 Cong. Rec. H. 1223 (Feb. 1, 1996).
226. See supra note 83-84 and accompanying text.
227. House Bill § 321 (establishing general eligibility for low-income families); Senate Bill
§ 201(o)(4) (providing assistance to low-income families if they meet eligibility criteria that PHAs may
specify).
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renter households and 40 percent of the U.S. population have incomes within
80 percent of the area median."' Because these plans would not increase
expenditures to cover the expanded pool of applicants, these proposals
effectively would transfer substantial resources from the poor to the middle
class, violating the principle of progressivity. Furthermore, the Republican
proposals would not restore the important federal preference for involuntarily
displaced families, 9  nor would they end mandatory inspections," 0 which
achieve little benefit while imposing serious inequities on program recipients.
The current housing reform bills also would not promote residential choice
and mobility. For example, neither bill requires PHAs to reduce search costs
through such policies as improved housing counseling and landlord outreach,
extended search times, or transportation and child care assistance. In fact, each
bill contains provisions reflecting a bias against moves of poor people to urban
areas. The Senate version, for example, explicitly repeals the Moving to
Opportunity program referred to in Part V. 1 Similarly, the House bill would
require a special study regarding the overconcentration of Section 8 recipients
in Chicago suburbs, as proposed by a Republican Congressman who originally
wanted to put a moratorium on the use of Section 8 in these areas."
Also, the Republican proposals would not reduce the problems arising from
the decentralized operation of Section 8 housing assistance. Neither bill, for
instance, would encourage PHAs to work together to prepare and distribute
regional information about available landlords. 3 Moreover, the House bill
would discourage urban PHAs from promoting interjurisdctional mobility
because it would completely take away lucrative administrative fees from PHAs
when subsidy recipients move to other jurisdictions.' The House bill also
would compound existing problems of undue local control by allowing PHAs
the discretion to set subsidy levels. Potentially, PHAs experiencing pressure
from middle-class residents could establish very low subsidy levels in order to
prevent poor families from moving into higher-income neighborhoods. 5
228. See Sard II, supra note 45, at 183.
229. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
230. House Bill § 328 (requiring dwelling units to meet standards at least as stringent as federal
housing quality standards to be promulgated by HUD); Senate Bill § 201(o)(8) (requiring initial and
periodic inspections).
231. Senate Bill § 206(1).
232. House Bill § 373 (mandating study in metropolitan Chicago of "the adverse impact on local
communities due to geographic concentration of assisted households"); see also Flynn McRoberts,
WellerHopes Bill WillLead to Review of HJD Vouchers, Nov. 14, 1995, at2; Anne Hazard, Committee
Passes Legislation Directing HUD to Study Low Income Housing, STATES NEws SERVIcE, Nov. 9,
1995.
233. See supra Section V.E.
234. The current policy allows originating PHAs to retain twenty percent of the fees. See supra
note 186.
235. House Bill § 322(a) (stating that family's rental contribution shall be determined based on
factors "including the adjusted income of the family and any other factors that the [PHA] considers
appropriate"). The family must pay at least $25, and it must pay for its own utilities. Id.
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Additionally, the Republican legislation would not balance appropriately the
rights of landlords and tenants. The bills do end certain unnecessary burdens
on landlords, such as the endless lease requirement. 6 Unfortunately, neither
proposal would establish appropriate anti-discrimination provisions to prevent
landlords from refusing to accept Section 8 families as tenants. Moreover, the
House proposal would provide landlords with greater eviction powers over
Section 8 tenants than they have over other tenants. The bill would permit a
landlord to evict a Section 8 family at any time merely for "other good
cause,"2 7 even though under most state laws a landlord may not evict a
tenant during the lease if the tenant is not in breach of lease provisions. s
Finally, the House and Senate bills include payment schemes that would be
significantly worse than the payment structure suggested in Part VI. The Senate
bill, for example, would establish a payment schedule almost identical to the
certificate program,239 thus discouraging households from bargaining for
affordable, quality apartments. The House bill is no better. By allowing PHAs
to develop their own methods for calculating subsidy levels,2" the bill would
not ensure that appropriate shopping and bargaining incentives are built into the
Section 8 payment structure.
In short, the Republican legislative proposals would not resolve the crises
of unaffordable housing and limited residential choice facing poor urban
families. The bills would redirect assistance to higher income families, fail to
promote residential choice, and create perverse payment structures.
C. The Potential for Refonn
Although the reforms proposed in this Note would dramatically improve the
Section 8 program, they would undoubtedly encounter significant resistance
from several interest groups. For example, local PHAs would strongly resist
the proposal to end their involvement in the Section 8 program entirely. They
probably also would resent the more limited proposal to require regional
housing mobility programs operated by regional government agencies or non-
236. See supra note 142. The bills also would dispense with the ninety day termination notice
requirement. See supra note 149.
237. House Bill § 325(a)(1) (stating that owner may terminate tenancy for "violation of the terms
and conditions of the lease, violation of applicable federal, state, or local law, or other good cause").
238. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROjECr, NATIONAL HOUSING Acr TRAsHES AMERICAN DREAM
7 (1995).
239. In order to rent an apartment that costs less than the payment standard, a recipient family must
pay a fixed amount (usually 30% of its adjusted monthly income) for rent regardless of the total rent
level set by the landlord, and the PHA pays the landlord the difference between the rent and the required
tenant payment. Senate Bill § 201(o)(2). A PHA must set payment standards between 90 and 120% of
the local FMR. Id. at § 201(o)(1)(B). Unlike the certificate program, the Senate bill would allow
families to rent apartments requiring them to spend more than 30% of adjusted family income on
housing. At the time a family initially receives assistance, however, the total amount that it must pay
for rent may not exceed 40% of monthly adjusted income. Id. at § 201(o)(2)-(3).
240. See supra note 235.
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profit organizations." Also, some white suburban residents would vigorous-
ly oppose mobility measures because of racism and out of fear that an influx
of poor people would cause increased crime and would overburden local
schools and social services. 2 Furthermore, some minority politicians in
urban areas might oppose mobility efforts for fear that a dispersal strategy
would weaken their power base.243 Landlord representatives would complain
about certain features of the proposals, such as the source-of-income
nondiscrimination requirement,2' and tenant advocates would denounce the
proposed elimination of inspections and the proposed removal of certain
eviction protections.24
Despite the breadth of potential opposition, the proposals outlined in this
Note are necessary improvements to the Section 8 program. The revised
enrollment procedures would more fairly allocate the limited assistance
available and would ensure that subsidy recipients can actually use their
subsidies in the private market. At the same time, the mobility provisions
would provide poor residents with maximum residential choice, generating
some corresponding increase in socioeconomic integration throughout
metropolitan areas. Finally, the revised payment structure would~capture the
power of this increased choice, thus improving the program's cost-effectiveness
and residents' housing quality. Once restructured, Section 8 can finally become
an effective tool in the fight against the nation's housing problems.
241. See Tegeler et al., Transforming Section 8 into a Regional Housing Mobility Program 21
(draft paper prepared for First National Conference on Housing Mobility as an Anti-Poverty Strategy,
on file with the Yale Law and Policy Review) ("[The Section 8] institutional constituency now consists
of over 2500 separate administering agencies and countless thousands of agency employees. They are
far better organized and much better financed than the Section 8 applicants and tenants who are the
intended beneficiaries of the program. The program has been molded to accommodate the concerns of
the local interests that control these agencies and the well organized and influential national coalitions
of program administrators who represent them. Their primary interests may ignore or even be at odds
with housing mobility goals.").
242. See Karen de Witt, Housing Voucher Test in Maryland Is Scuttled by a Political Firestorm,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at BO.
243. See Hughes, supra note 48, at 289.
244. See Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (Nov. 3, 1993) (testimony of Thomas R. Shuler, Pres., National Apartment
Association) (criticizing proposed non-discrimination provision and stating that "[w]e shouldn't try to
paper over design flaws by legislatively mandating [landlord] participation").
245. See Bryson, supra note 132, at 46 (stating that National Housing Law Project favors strong
eviction protections for tenants "as an important safeguard against them becoming homeless").
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APPENDIX
This Appendix confirms several arguments of the Note with reference to
New Haven, Connecticut and surrounding suburbs. As occurs in many
metropolitan areas, the City of New Haven has dramatically higher concentra-
tions of poverty and racial minorities than do the nearby suburban towns.3
Even though the suburbs have significant numbers of apartments that are
affordable under the Section 8 program, 7 the overwhelming majority of
black urban households receiving Section 8 remain in the poorest neighbor-
hoods of the City of New Haven.2'8 Finally, like other urban PHAs, the
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven does not provide significant
suburban housing options to its Section 8 recipients.
24 9
These data and maps obviously only provide a crude glimpse into the
demography and Section 8 patterns of Greater New Haven, and the results are
not necessarily indicative of other urban areas. Nonetheless, the following
presentation suggests how quantitative tools and mapping technology can help
policy makers and the public understand the geography of poverty and housing
in urban areas.
1. Urban Concentration of Poverty and Racial Minorities
The socioeconomic characteristics of the City of New Haven contrast
sharply with the features of twelve surrounding suburban towns shown in Map
A. As seen in Figure 6, for example, the City of New Haven has only 30% of
the total population of Greater New Haven, but the city has 62% of the area's
population under the poverty line and 75% of the area's black and Hispanic
populations.
Maps B through E further illustrate the geography of socioeconomic
characteristics in the Greater New Haven area. Information was extracted from
1990 U.S. Census data available on CD-ROMI ° and compiled using
MapInfo, a Geographic Information Systems software package. The maps
present the data at the smallest possible resolution, a Census unit known as a
246. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing urban concentration of poverty
nationally).
247. Seesupra notes 116-117 and accompanying text (demonstrating wide availability of apartments
renting below FMRs throughout metropolitan areas).
248. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (describing limited residential mobility of
subsidy recipients).
249. See supra notes 175 and 185-187 and accompanying tekt (explaining why urban PHAs fail to
promote mobility among subsidy recipients).
250. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY TAPE
FILE 3A (Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, Vermont) (CD90-3A-10).
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"block group."251
2. Widespread Availability of Qualifying Housing
Census data confirm that Section 8 recipients could access significant
affordable housing opportunities throughout the Greater New Haven area in
1990. The one-bedroom and two-bedroom FMRs for that year were $581 and
$684, respectively.' 2 After subtracting utility allowances for natural gas
appliances,sI households could pay $501 and $586 a month respectively for
one-bedroom and two-bedroom apartments.
Figure 7 and Maps F, G, and H show the geographical distribution of units
with contract rents at or below $500, as revealed by the 1990 Census. Note
that this investigative technique seriously underestimates the number of two-
bedroom apartments available to Section 8 households because it fails to show
the apartments with monthly rents between $500 and the rental ceiling of $586.
Nonetheless, a comparison between these results and the distribution of public
assistance recipients in Map D suggests that a significant amount of affordable
housing did exist outside of the most impoverished urban neighborhoods in
1990.
3. Geographic Concentration of Urban Section 8 Recipients
Most black households receiving Section 8 assistance from the Housing
Authority of the City of New Haven use their subsidies in poor neighborhoods
within the city limits. In May 1995, black households received about 55 % of
the certificates and vouchers operated by the Housing Authority.' Figure
8 shows that most of these black families remained in the City of New
Haven,7ss and Maps I, J, and K use geocoding technology to show that these
251. In 1990, the median population of block groups in Greater New Haven was 1109. Id. (author's
calculations).
252. Fair Market Rents for Existing Housing, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,866, 39,873 (1989).
253. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV., SECTION 8 ExIsnNG HOUSING ALLOWANCES FOR
TENANT FURNISHED UTIuTIES AND OTHER SERVICES (1990) (on file with the Yale Law and Policy
Review).
254. Of 2066 total households holding Section 8 certificates and vouchers operated by the Housing
Authority of the City of New Haven in May 1995, approximately 55 % were black, 31% were Hispanic,
and 11% were white. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, Computer Printout of Race and
Addresses of Households Receiving Section 8 Certificate and Voucher Subsidies from the Housing
Authority of the City of New Haven (May 13, 1995) (on file with author).
255. In May 1995, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven maintained assistance contracts
with all Section 8 households who were residents of the city but then moved to surrounding suburbs.
Federal regulations did encourage PHAs to take over administration of the assistance contracts of
subsidy holders who move into their jurisdiction. See 24 C.F.R. § 887.555 (1995) (recommending but
not requiring voluntary arrangements among PHAs to reassign contracts for families moving between
PHA jurisdictions). Suburban PHAs in the Greater New Haven area, however, were under budgetary
and political pressure not to take over the assistance contracts, in order not to use up subsidies which
could be used for their own residents. As a result, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven
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families concentrated in certain neighborhoods, particularly in areas with high
poverty rates.
Absent in-depth interviews or regression analyses, these composite data do
not explain the residential decisions of Section 8 recipient households in the
City of New Haven. For example, some black families may choose to remain
in low-income urban locations because of their desire to remain close to family
and friends. Nonetheless, the national data presented in the Notep5 suggest
that a substantial portion of these households would prefer to move to
affordable housing in better neighborhoods, either in the City of New Haven
or its suburbs. Lack of housing information and lack of adequate transportation
may limit recipients' ability to move to the neighborhoods of their choice.
4. Lack of Suburban Housing Information for Urban Section 8 Recipients
Urban PHAs generally are not effective at helping households to move to
suburban locations.' Not surprisingly, therefore, the Housing Authority of
the City of New Haven provides only minimal information to households
wishing to move to suburban locations, as demonstrated by the official landlord
list the Housing Authority provided to Section 8 recipients in May 1995.11
Map L shows that the list contained 296 apartments, more than 95 % of which
were in the city itself, with only about 4% in Hamden and 1% in West
Haven. 9 The location of advertising landlords probably results from the
nature and extent of the Housing Authority's outreach efforts, as well as from
geographic variations in rental markets and landlord attitudes. Note the
similarity between the distribution of advertised rental units and the areas of
high minority concentration shown in Map J, providing confirmation of the
Section 8 submarket effect suggested by national studies.'
(May 12, 1995).
256. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 175, 185-187 and accompanying text.
258. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, Section 8 Landlord List, Apr. 7, 1995 (on file
with the Yale Law and Policy Review).
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
Yale Law & Policy Review
FIGURE 6: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF GREATER NEW HAVEN
(1990)
261
Demographic City of Surrounding City of New
Characteristics New Townsw Haven and
Haven a2  Surrounding
Towns
Total population 131,020 310,477 441,497
Whites (non-Hispanic) 64,402 284,605 349,007
49% 92% 79%
Blacks (non-Hispanic) 47,368 15,294 62,662
36% 5% 14%
Hispanics 15,273 5723 20,996
12% 2% 5%
Household median $27,551 $43,631 $38,907
income
% of population 19% 5% 9%
under poverty line
% of households 15% 4% 7%
receiving public
assistance
261. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 250 (author's calculations).
262. Consists of 128 block groups.
263. Consists of 270 block groups, representing Ansonia, Branford, Derby, East Haven, Hamden,
North Branford, North Haven, Orange, Seymour, West Haven, and Woodbridge.
264. Consists of 398 block groups.
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FIGURE 7: AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN GREATER NEW HAVEN (1990)1,
Housing Town Surrounding Town of




Occupied rental units 33,349 34,848 68,197
Occupied owned units 15,847 84,810 100,657
One bedroom rental units 5226 3483 8709
with contract rent less
than $500
Two bedroom rental units 3924 2358 6282
with contract rent less
than $500
FIGURE 8: DISrRIBUTION OF BLACK RECIPIENTS OF SECTION 8 VOUCHERS
AND CERTIFICATES PROVIDED BY THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY
OF NEW HAVEN (MAY 1995)266
Ultimate location Number of recipients Percentage of total
New Haven 1096 95%




Connecticut, outside 1 0%
New Haven County
Outside Connecticut 1 0%
TOTAL 1153 100 %
265. Id.; Fair Market Rents for Existing Housing, supra note 252 (author's calculations).
266. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, supra note 254 (author's calculations).
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MAPS CONCERNING GREATER NEW HAVEN
MAP A: TOWNS OF GREATER NEW HAVEN
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267. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 250.
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MAP G: DISTRIBUTION OF AFFORDABLE ONE-BEDROOM UNITS272
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273. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 250; Fair Market Rents for Existing Housing, supra
note 252.
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274. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, supra note 254.
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MAP J: AREAS WITH HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF BLACK
SECTION 8 RECIPIENTS275
275. Id.
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MAP K: BLACK SECTION 8 RESIDENTS AND HIGH POVERTY ARE 2 76
276. Id.; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 250.
350
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MAP L: DISTRIBUTION OF APARTMENTS ON THE SECTION 8 AVAILABLE
APAmrMENT LIs rI n
277. Section 8 Landlord List, supra note 258.

